Iraq and Afghanistan

In today’s Op-Ed, Thomas Friedman takes a highly realistic, but somewhat questionable view of what we are about in Iraq. He essentially says that the freedom we are bringing the Iraqis is the freedom to kill one another if they wish to. He argues that what we have now is Iraq is a civil war. Essentially our job now is to get through the election so that we might transfer the full job of fighting the civil war to the Iraqis where it belongs. If the Iraqis cannot put together a civil compact that will allow them to end the war, then God help them. We do not have the responsibility of staying until they are up to the task — which may be never.

Friedman asks "What kind of a majority are the Iraqi Shiites ready to be — a tolerant and inclusive one, or an intolerant and exclusive one? What kind of a minority do the Iraqi Sunnis intend to be — rebellious and separatist, or loyal and sharing?" Unfortunately, these questions already have their answers. Neither side, nor the Kurds to the side, will be all that idealistic. If we rely on their kindness and good faith, the game is lost. How they will view the pros and cons of not so promising alternatives is another matter, one that Friedman does not go into.

But this raises the question again, "By What Right Did We Launch This War"? If as Friedman says, the Iraqis did not want liberation in our sense, and if we cannot make them want it, then what was a achievable goal that made the war worth it to the Iraqi people and the Americans? Yes, Saddam was terrible. He killed lots of Iraqis, he held them down. But within this shell many lived reasonably successful lives. We had it in our power to keep Saddam away from weapons of mass destruction and improving marginally the standard of living of average Iraqis. It would have cost less for all concerned. We should make these calculations again when we are faced with a similar temptation to end tyranny. (By the way, I believe life in North Korea is a good deal worse than that in Saddam's Iraq. So here we go again. . . )