Monday, December 27, 2004
Iraq: When to Get Out
On a sober-sided talk show the other day, a retired military officer was interviewed on the subject of how long we would be in Iraq. His answer was that it would be ten or fifteen years before our soldiers could leave. The argument was that the violence was simply not going down and the Iraqis we were training showed no signs of being able to pick up the slack. This argument has three possible bases.
(1) A lack of understanding of the war. The authority has not yet realized the extent to which the insurgency in Iraq is a response to the presence of foreign troops as much as to any other factor. He also has no concept of the extent to which the American population is tired of the war and is bound to grow increasingly tired if the promised elections lead to no change in our commitment.
(2) A confusion of the war in Iraq with the war against al-Qaida. The authority believes firmly that what we are fighting is primarily a Islamic Jihadist movement aimed at the United States. This being the case Iraq is just as good a place to engage the enemy as any other.
(3) Imperialist dreams. The authority is really entranced by the idea that we need to establish at least a semi-permanent base in the Middle East from which we can coerce the entire area while we convert the area through force and persuasion the area to democracy.
The fact is we are fighting a well financed Iraqi nationalist and Sunni Arab insurgency. This being the case, one of the primarily preconditions for ending the insurgency is the withdrawal of American forces. This may not end the insurgency, but without it, there is no way to end it. Accepting this analysis, once the Americans leave, the Kurds and Shi’as will have to work out a modus vivendi with these Baath forces or continue an endless fight against them. The eventual answer may be a de facto or de jure splitting up of the country, Yugoslavia style. In either case, we should not see preventing this or solving these relationships as our problem. (Many in the world may say “You broke it, you fix it”. But I do not think most Iraqis will feel this way. They want once again to be the decisive force in their country.) These are Iraqi problems and we should encourage them, possibly with international assistance, to solve them.
The United States will never recapture its role as the last resort for the preservation of world peace as long as it is identified with Iraq and our forces are tied down there. The American people are only prepared to do so much. And with a commitment anything like that we have today in Iraq, we are neither able to defend adequately our interests nor world interests in the many hot spots that fizz and bubble around the world.
If we have not already begun the process, we should begin talks with the political leaders of Iraq (and this includes the Ayatollah Sistani in spite of his disclaimers) about a time table for our orderly withdrawal. We should complete the training of Iraqi forces now in the pipeline and improve the performance of forces already “trained”, but then let them take over as we withdraw. The new parliament will write a constitution. By the time that is completed toward the end of 2005, we should announce victory and retire.
(1) A lack of understanding of the war. The authority has not yet realized the extent to which the insurgency in Iraq is a response to the presence of foreign troops as much as to any other factor. He also has no concept of the extent to which the American population is tired of the war and is bound to grow increasingly tired if the promised elections lead to no change in our commitment.
(2) A confusion of the war in Iraq with the war against al-Qaida. The authority believes firmly that what we are fighting is primarily a Islamic Jihadist movement aimed at the United States. This being the case Iraq is just as good a place to engage the enemy as any other.
(3) Imperialist dreams. The authority is really entranced by the idea that we need to establish at least a semi-permanent base in the Middle East from which we can coerce the entire area while we convert the area through force and persuasion the area to democracy.
The fact is we are fighting a well financed Iraqi nationalist and Sunni Arab insurgency. This being the case, one of the primarily preconditions for ending the insurgency is the withdrawal of American forces. This may not end the insurgency, but without it, there is no way to end it. Accepting this analysis, once the Americans leave, the Kurds and Shi’as will have to work out a modus vivendi with these Baath forces or continue an endless fight against them. The eventual answer may be a de facto or de jure splitting up of the country, Yugoslavia style. In either case, we should not see preventing this or solving these relationships as our problem. (Many in the world may say “You broke it, you fix it”. But I do not think most Iraqis will feel this way. They want once again to be the decisive force in their country.) These are Iraqi problems and we should encourage them, possibly with international assistance, to solve them.
The United States will never recapture its role as the last resort for the preservation of world peace as long as it is identified with Iraq and our forces are tied down there. The American people are only prepared to do so much. And with a commitment anything like that we have today in Iraq, we are neither able to defend adequately our interests nor world interests in the many hot spots that fizz and bubble around the world.
If we have not already begun the process, we should begin talks with the political leaders of Iraq (and this includes the Ayatollah Sistani in spite of his disclaimers) about a time table for our orderly withdrawal. We should complete the training of Iraqi forces now in the pipeline and improve the performance of forces already “trained”, but then let them take over as we withdraw. The new parliament will write a constitution. By the time that is completed toward the end of 2005, we should announce victory and retire.
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