Iraq and Afghanistan

The primary conclusion of Noah Feldman’s “What We Owe Iraq: War and the Ethics of Nation Building” is that by invading Iraq with an announced intention to build a renewed nation we have taken on a responsibility of trusteeship that cannot be lightly laid down. While he agrees that we must press on toward elections, he insist that even the completion of elections will not end the matter. Until the Iraqis are able to establish security, that is, actually rule their country in a satisfactory manner, we will be ethically bound to provide security for the new institutions. When they can run the place themselves, and this may be several years from now, then we can say that the nation-building phase is over and leave. By being able to rule, Feldman specifically does not mean that the new government needs to be able to defend the country from others. As he points out, South Korea is sovereign, but we still aid in its defense.

For several reasons, I do not agree. Our implicit promise to the Iraqis was to give them the opportunity to form a new and better political society than Saddam offered them. As long as he lived, they were evidently unable to get out from under his tyranny. We came, we shoved him aside, we invested many lives in trying to give them this opportunity. Many Iraqis have responded in ways that have impeded our objectives. First, a portion of the population mounted an insurgent campaign that continues. Second, the rest of the society has been unable to come forward in sufficient numbers and with sufficient determination to take over the security responsibility in spite of a great deal of effort by the Coalition forces. It would seem to me that if we support the process until an election whose results are welcomed and accepted by a significant part of the population, we should then work out with the new government the terms of our departure. The resources and attention of the United States are not infinite. There are many other crises and potential crises in the world that demand our resources and leadership. This is a larger ethical issue. As long as we are stuck with an effort of the size we have in Iraq we can simply look on as events elsewhere deteriorate. We cannot be effective. And the rest of the world knows it.

Let us compare our effort in Iraq with that in Afghanistan. In the latter we brought in a much smaller force, even if we include those from NATO and elsewhere. The populations and size of country are roughly similar. We continue to have violent incidents in Afghanistan. Yet since we have had an election, the future of the country seems firmly in the hands of the new government in spite of its relatively incompetent security forces. We will keep troops there indefinitely. But these are small units and the purpose is not primarily to shore up the government. I suggest that we will leave the Afghans to work out their own future, even if it is not a perfect democracy. Much of the country is in the hands of warlords. That may remain the case. So be it.

Turning back to Iraq, we see that there are many segments of the population. Thinking of experience in the Balkans and elsewhere Feldman evidently sees our responsibility the creation of a unitary state. If we stay, this is what we will insist on, may even be forced to fight for. But it seems to me that this is an aspect of the Iraqi future that we should not weigh in on. If the state breaks up, we do not want to be a party to it. On the other hand, it could be best for the Iraqis. At least the Kurds have fought too long for autonomy to have it denied to them now. We should leave a leveler playing field on which some of these decisions can be worked out. Then leave it to the Iraqis.