Tuesday, November 16, 2004
Once Again: Disassembling the Problem to Reach a Solution in Iraq
The present situation in Iraq appears once again to be reaching disaster proportions. Part of the trouble has been the insistence that without control of every part of the country, we cannot hold the promised January elections. Once again I would like to suggest that this must be finessed. We have the vast majority of Kurds and Shi’as either on our side or neutral. It would be nice if they lived in definite geographical areas, but they do not. Particularly in cities such as Baghdad and Mosul there is a mixed population, although there are different areas of these cities dominated by particular groups. Nevertheless, with careful consideration of the views of democratic party leaders and Ayatollah Sistani we can bring about enough peace in three-fourth of the country to hold reasonably good elections. They have long insisted that this is what they want.
At this time, we must hold urgent meetings with the leaders of Iraqi factions and parties laying out the conditions of our withdrawal from the country. Going over the map area by area (and sometimes out lines will not follow the provincial boundaries) we should demonstrate how and when American and other coalition forces will withdraw as they are replaced by Iraqi national army, guard, police, or militia units. We must make it clear that immediately after the election succeeds in areas where it is feasible a timetable for this area will be laid out. This timetable will have an estimated date of departure for major American and coalition units from this “Democratic Iraq” in July 2005. This discussion should strengthen support for elections since it will tie our departure from specified areas of Iraq to election success. Democratic Iraq will at this point might be expected to include more than half the country’s area and perhaps 60% of its people.
We should then discuss what will happen in the remainder of the country, labeled “Occupied Iraq”. This is the area where effective elections will not have been held by February 1 and where Iraqi national security forces still cannot without outside assistance guarantee reasonable security. In Occupied Iraq we will promise to hold the line against the insurgency with American and coalition troops until such time as Iraqi national forces can take over. We will attempt to do this without major offensive actions. After national forces have had three months of experience through assuming security functions in Democratic Iraq, their more experienced units should be introduced into Occupied Iraq. Experiments with their introduction should begin in mixed contexts such as Mosul and Baghdad. Only after they have shown their effectiveness in such situations will these forces be used to replace American forces in the most hotly contested Sunni Arab areas. Gradually the American presence would then be reduced in Occupied Iraq. The transition process should not be hurried. But there should be a commitment to have all major American units out of Iraq three months after Iraqi national forces have assumed responsibility in essentially all Sunni Arab areas.
From about May to August, Democratic Iraq will be in the process of extending its control over the entire country. In those areas in which it was not possible previously to hold successfully elections, they should be held or reheld and the resulting winners integrated into the national parliament.
If it is impossible to work out such an agreement and the accompanying timetable with a sufficient number of the most representative non-insurgent leaders, then the United States should calmly point out that the American public and that of the other coalition partners are not committed to an unending military presence in the country. If the Iraqi leadership does not go along with our suggestions, or propose alternatives that meet our objectives in other ways, our intention will be to remove our forces by July 1 through a phased withdrawal regardless of the security situation. If they still wish to hold the elections in January, we will help where we can. But we cannot guarantee security everywhere, and we cannot be responsible for the possibly unrepresentative nature of the result nor the ethnic fighting that may break out as we leave. Nor will we be able to prevent the possibility of a further deterioration of the security situation for Iraqis in much of the country.
At this time, we must hold urgent meetings with the leaders of Iraqi factions and parties laying out the conditions of our withdrawal from the country. Going over the map area by area (and sometimes out lines will not follow the provincial boundaries) we should demonstrate how and when American and other coalition forces will withdraw as they are replaced by Iraqi national army, guard, police, or militia units. We must make it clear that immediately after the election succeeds in areas where it is feasible a timetable for this area will be laid out. This timetable will have an estimated date of departure for major American and coalition units from this “Democratic Iraq” in July 2005. This discussion should strengthen support for elections since it will tie our departure from specified areas of Iraq to election success. Democratic Iraq will at this point might be expected to include more than half the country’s area and perhaps 60% of its people.
We should then discuss what will happen in the remainder of the country, labeled “Occupied Iraq”. This is the area where effective elections will not have been held by February 1 and where Iraqi national security forces still cannot without outside assistance guarantee reasonable security. In Occupied Iraq we will promise to hold the line against the insurgency with American and coalition troops until such time as Iraqi national forces can take over. We will attempt to do this without major offensive actions. After national forces have had three months of experience through assuming security functions in Democratic Iraq, their more experienced units should be introduced into Occupied Iraq. Experiments with their introduction should begin in mixed contexts such as Mosul and Baghdad. Only after they have shown their effectiveness in such situations will these forces be used to replace American forces in the most hotly contested Sunni Arab areas. Gradually the American presence would then be reduced in Occupied Iraq. The transition process should not be hurried. But there should be a commitment to have all major American units out of Iraq three months after Iraqi national forces have assumed responsibility in essentially all Sunni Arab areas.
From about May to August, Democratic Iraq will be in the process of extending its control over the entire country. In those areas in which it was not possible previously to hold successfully elections, they should be held or reheld and the resulting winners integrated into the national parliament.
If it is impossible to work out such an agreement and the accompanying timetable with a sufficient number of the most representative non-insurgent leaders, then the United States should calmly point out that the American public and that of the other coalition partners are not committed to an unending military presence in the country. If the Iraqi leadership does not go along with our suggestions, or propose alternatives that meet our objectives in other ways, our intention will be to remove our forces by July 1 through a phased withdrawal regardless of the security situation. If they still wish to hold the elections in January, we will help where we can. But we cannot guarantee security everywhere, and we cannot be responsible for the possibly unrepresentative nature of the result nor the ethnic fighting that may break out as we leave. Nor will we be able to prevent the possibility of a further deterioration of the security situation for Iraqis in much of the country.
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