Iraq and Afghanistan

“The Future of Iraq: Dictatorship, Democracy, or Division” by Liam Anderson and Gareth Stansfield argues that Iraq is an artificial state that can probably be held together only by the use of Saddam-like violence. In particular, they argue that it is in our interest to allow the Kurds to form a state of their own in the north. Their case is many pronged. First, they see it as a moral duty of the international community. They were promised such a state after World War II only to have it taken away from them because of Turkish objections. The rest of the world has subsequently used Kurdish insurrections for their own purposes on several occasions, only to abandon the Kurds to their fate when it was no longer in the interest of the larger power (often the United States). Second, and related to this, Iraq is an artificial state. The northern or Mosul Province (an Ottoman Province that included the Kurdish area, but also a good deal more) was added as an after thought to the Ottoman Provinces of central and southern Iraq. The Kurds have since then never stopped revolting. Third, the only example today of a peaceful and more or less democratic area in Iraq is Kurdistan. For over five years the Kurds have managed to live a reasonably modern and prosperous life in their enclave. Politically this amounts to no more than two one-party states that hardly meet our definition of democracy. Still, in the context of Iraq, this is an important accomplishment. It should not be lightly abandoned in a search for a more perfect Iraq. Finally, if we try to force all parts of Iraq to live together, we will end up with something like Bosnia where only the presence of foreign troops prevents the parts from once again being at one another’s throats.

The argument of Stansfield and Gareth is appealing. The Kurds do have a right. And we have no “duty” to reestablish Iraq within its prewar borders. However, were we to follow this route, there would be many short-term losses. We would not gain friends among the Sunni or Shi’a who might argue that we were destroying Iraq, and that we had this in mind all the time. We also would find few friends among the Turks who would view the new state as a threat. The Iranians also would find an independent Kurdistan threatening, and would in any event side with the Shiites. Much of the world would argue that we have betrayed our responsibility in Iraq. (This would be particularly true if we took the Anderson and Stansfield suggestion that we establish a permanent military base in Kurdistan to oversee the area.) However, in the longer term supporting an independent Kurdistan may prove to have been a good fallback position. We would feel better about ourselves. We would have made a firm friend in the area (which we need badly). And if the rest of Iraq goes to hell, we would have at least one positive accomplishment to look back on.

A middle ground might be found if we could persuade (and continue to persuade) the Kurds to accept a semiautonomous state within Iraq and the Sunnis and Shi’as to accept such a solution. Given past history, it would be hard for either side to believe the promises of the other. However, if this the agreement fell apart later, this might mean Kurdistan becomes independent in 2010 rather than 2005 — not a bad outcome. For in this scenario many of the criticisms of the United States would be greatly muted, and yet we would have achieved a free Kurdistan. If the autonomy arrangement hold, even better. Of course, getting to the final solution is likely to entail some fighting. But with very little help the Kurds should be able to hold up their end. And eliminating violence from the scene in Iraq in either 2005 or 2010 is, in any event, most improbable.