Iraq and Afghanistan

A large group of political parties in Iraq, including most of the Sunni parties and the two major Kurdish parties, met a couple of days ago. The result was a proclamation asking for the elections to be postponed six months so that the whole population would be able to vote with security. One of these parties was that of the Prime Minister Allawi, although he has himself not taken a position on the issue. The response of the American Ambassador and President Bush was to insist that the election had to take place on January 30. The Elections Commission also agreed, saying that they had no authority to postpone the elections beyond January. Yesterday, the representative of the Ayatollah Sistani weighed in with a statement that the elections could not be delayed. At about the same time forty political groups, mostly Shiite, issued a “fiery statement” that the elections must not be delayed.

What is happening is this. The Kurds have apparently come to realize that if they are to have any chance of stopping a Shiite juggernaut able to write a constitution forever taking away their hard-won autonomy, they need to work with the Sunni Arabs — a group they hate on other grounds, including the identification of many Sunni Arabs with Saddam’s persecutions. If the elections are held early, then the Sunnis will not have time enough to organize effectively in their highly volatile provinces and sections of Baghdad, and they will not have time to get the recalcitrant Sunni groups such as the Muslim Scholars to give up their opposition to the elections. The result will be that the Shiites will turn out a relatively larger vote than they would have if the country were all peaceful and the Sunnis will turn out a relatively small vote. The Kurds apparently have the additional problem in that their efforts to repopulate Kirkuk and the surrounding area with Kurds will not be far enough advanced on January 30. On the other hand, the Shi’a know that the security situation will make their majority even clearer than it would be otherwise. They would welcome the opportunity to impose whatever constitution they would like.

In the short term, this presents a challenge to the Americans. The need the continued support of the Shi’a or the enterprise is lost. They hope that the Kurds will stay on board in the last analysis because of their old support for the process. The Americans can hardly hope, however, that keeping to the January time table, which much of the Arab and Western world already opposes, is going to increase the legitimacy of the exercise. For a country that loves to criticize others for not having “free and fair” elections, carrying out present plans under what many consider impossible conditions, is not an easy choice. The United States is also concerned that giving the Shi’a a free hand in drawing up the constitution might result in a theocracy much like Iran. I believe that this possibility is much overdrawn, but it certainly enters the minds of some American leaders.

In the longer term, if Iraq’s leaders remain split over the timing of the election, then this may be the first step toward a breaking up of the country into three or more pieces. While the Shi’a have the votes, the other two groups have shown themselves more effective in the violence department. It is not at all clear that the Shi’a could force the other groups into a united Iraq with them in undisputed control. It could be done with American help. But I do not think that we want to take on the task of forcefully uniting Iraq after elections. It will soon be time for us to go.