Iraq and Afghanistan

As mentioned in my last post, the international community apparently agrees with the Ayatollah Sistani that elections are the key to legitimizing and ultimately resolving the problem of Iraq. However, unlike the Americans (officially) and the interim government so far, many foreign representatives believe the date of January 30 that has been set may be unreasonably soon. It is clear that the insurgency continues apace in the Sunni Arab areas. Although there has been some decline in the frequency of incidents recently, it is still higher than before Falluja II. 90 of the country’s 540 registration centers have been closed in recent weeks because of the threat of violence. Registration has been proceeding well outside these areas. In Baghdad, there is a surprising expectation that eighty percent or more of the population will vote on January 30. In the worst areas, where registration may remain impossible, one idea is to allow registration on the day of voting to prevent effective insurgent interference.

All parties have been much exercised by the problem of how the voters might be protected. The United States now plans on increasing the size of its force in Iraq by 4000 or so to help guard the process. This is still woefully inadequate. The plan, in any event, is to keep American forces away from polling places to reduce the appearance of a coerced vote. Yet the Iraqis have less than half the number of security personnel that had been thought necessary for the protection of the booths. In addition, faith has been lost in police forces as evidence mounts that many units have been penetrated. The police chief of Mosul has been arrested after apparently accepting a $600,000 bribe from the insurgents. In Mosul, Kurdish militias were brought in to fill the gap. Some Iraqi leaders are suggesting that some of the Shiite militias be asked to help guard the polling process. But given ethnic fears and party distrusts, such solutions might cause as many problems as they solve.