Iraq and Afghanistan

American officers also carry a heavy burden. For they know that they must persevere in a task that they have found increasingly discouraging. In this latest go-around, they have successfully organized a large-scale offensive into Falluja, chosen as a target because it had become symbolic of the ability of the resistance to succeed against the Americans and had become a center for the Islamist resistance, the most virulent form of the insurgency. It was also decided at the highest levels that the government must have control over all parts of Iraq for the elections in January to be “legitimate”. Yet the battle has worked out according to the plan of the insurgents and not their own. And they knew that this is what would happen. They knew that the Americans would have to use heavy firepower from air and ground to win a quick and decisive “victory”. They knew that this would require the destruction of much of the city and the incidental killing of many of the civilians that had not been able or willing to leave. They knew that this would have political costs. They knew that most of the insurgents and particularly their leaders would be gone before their troops could capture the place. And they knew that these cadres would instigate battles elsewhere in the country. They knew that the only way the “capture” of the city could have any meaning in the long run would be if the accompanying Iraqi governmental forces and police could quickly take over from the Americans and establish a new order in the city. They also knew that these forces might not be up to the challenge. They also knew that the most reliable governmental forces for the job would be Kurdish or Shiite units, but that these might end up being treated by the Fallujans as much as outsiders as the Americans.

What has happened since in the rest of the Sunni Triangle and nearby fits the predictions made before the battle. There have been major insurgent attacks. The most organized attack was in Mosul where an insurgent force said to be 500 strong attacked a number of points simultaneously. Many places the police failed, fleeing or deserting. The subsequent firing of the police chief, the bringing in of Kurdish units, and the return of American forces from the Fallujan area seems to have calmed the situation, but again at what cost? In Ramadi, near Falluja, the streets appear to be again out of control. And as they ponder the daily “police blotter” of enemy actions, the officers read in their brand new counterinsurgency manual that the longer Americans take the lead in counterinsurgency operations, the greater the resentment of the population, and the more the legitimacy of the host nation government is called into question. But the officers also know that decisions are being forced by events. They may have to put their reading on hold until this is over — or until a reassignment back to the States.