Iraq and Afghanistan

It is worth reading today’s discussion in the Week in Review of the difficulty of identifying the enemy in Iraq and the problem this poses for the American command. An American general is quoted as calling this a “negative insurgency” because the groups involved are not offering the Iraqi people any tangible benefits. Unlike other insurgencies, the insurgents have not established a political wing with a communicable political program. Some observers reason that a major reason for their negativity is that the insurgents are loosely organized into many separate groups, often with quite different and even clashing objectives. In this situation, the leaders of these groups may believe that it is better for now to abjure definite positions beyond anti-Americanism. It is, after all, a simple message, and simple messages are those most likely to mobilize large numbers of people. One can only assume that if insurgent success were imminent, the many groups of which they are composed might then shift their attention to their so far suppressed political agendas.

This suggests that if anti-Americanism is the major glue that holds most of these groups together, if we left violence would simply shift its focus. To some degree, it would. However, for the Coalition troops to leave might not be enough to change the focus in the short term. For there would still be in place the Iraqi political and security structure headed by Allawi. Would this continue to be viewed as no more than an American puppet, with a consequent intensification of efforts to drive it from power? If so, we should realize that defeating such a puppet could take longer than many suppose. We must remember that the South Vietnamese government held the country together for a year against one of the largest armies in the world after the Americans left.

We also must remember that the Shi’a hierarchy, the major Shi’a parties, and the major Kurdish parties stand to gain from the success of the political process headed by Allawi. Right now the Shi’as and Allawi are having difficulties because some Shi’a see Allawi as attempting to reestablish a Baathist and secular government. Yet if the Americans left, Allawi and the Shi’a would be forced to come to an understanding to resist the Sunni Arab insurgency. They might even be able to get al-Sadr on their side in this event. After initial losses in the aftermath of an American withdrawal, this new “coalition” might be able to consolidate control over most of the country. One can assume that eventually the Kurds and the rest of the country will have a falling out. But I place this after the democratic process has moved to at least the constitution writing stage. How a subsequent Kurdish challenge plays out will depend on the degree to which the Kurds will want to continue to play a role economically and politically in Baghdad.