Iraq and Afghanistan

The front page of today’s Times tells us that there is worry that most Sunni Arabs will not be willing to vote in the January election. Apparently several Sunni Arab political parties want to take part. But their members are too fearful of the insurgency in their area to allow themselves to be seen as supporting the election, standing for election, registering, or even voting. There is also reluctance to vote because of distrust and hatred of the Americans and the new system. But Sunni Arab leaders are quite aware that a boycott will not be to their sectarian advantage. The main issue seems to me to be simply fear, since most Sunni Arabs live in the high violence areas.

This same discussion reports that the Shi’as and Kurds, making up about 80% of the country are expected to vote in large numbers. This encouraging piece of information is combined with the fact that the agreement with the Mahdi Army in Sadr City seems to have held for at least two days. Today, the report is that in Sadr City the Mahdi Army is beginning to hand in its heavy weapons as promised in the agreement. Again there is talk of al-Sadr entering the political arena. These developments and estimates bring us back to the fundamental fact about the insurgency: it is overwhelmingly a reaction of the Sunni Arab population of the Sunni Triangle to the humiliation of having their leader and their system dispossessed. The promised move toward elections, a new constitution and finally parliamentary government will give the other majority sections of the population a weight in the society that they have never had before. As their leaders accept this fact, the insurgency should be even more confined to the triangle than it is today.

But what can be done for the Sunnis who want to vote? Some are said to be encouraged by the recent policy of suppressing the insurgency in Sunni Arab centers of resistance. But for each person encouraged another may be further enraged by the attacks, even more inclined to kill those of his neighbors who would cooperate. Ideally, there should be a formula by which 15% of the country could be temporarily left out of the voting, thereby satisfying the Ayatollah Sistani who demands an early vote and leaving the door open for the Sunni Arabs to come in later. Unfortunately, no one seems to be considering this option.