Monday, October 18, 2004
Iraq War: Pessimism Over the Top
The opponents of the Iraq War have many good arguments. It was “the wrong war at the wrong time in the wrong place”. Yet we are there, and all Americans and friends of what used to be called the “Free World” must realize that for both our country’s reputation and the good of the Iraqis we have to accomplish as much as we can while we are there and leave as early and as “successfully” as we can.
In today’s Times, Bob Herbert’s Op-Ed represents another example of the dark side of the liberal critique of the Bush Administration. Herbert tells us that “we find we can’t win this war we started”. Further down the page Herbert writes “As for the rebuilding of Iraq, forget about it.” These may appear to be brave words to Herbert’s admirers. They were words I might have written last April when it appeared our forces were entering the retreat phase of Napoleon’s invasion of Russia.
But today they no longer make sense. If we concentrate on the horror, on the repeated suicide bombings and mortar attacks, and mines along the roads, the picture can look black. But if we notice how these incidents have become more and more concentrated in the Sunni Arab areas, if we read reports detailing small gains here and there, of water systems reestablished, of electricity production which is now considerably above the level when we attacked, of schools that have been renovated, we will draw a different picture. If we note that the program of turning in weapons by the Mahdi Army is now being extended from Sadr City to other Shi’a areas in Iraq, we will see hope once more building. If we note the Shi’a majority in the South and the Kurdish enclaves in the North are expected to vote heavily in January, this will give another picture.
There is no doubt that the situation is still perilous, that the Sunni Arabs might be able to keep the insurgency up for months, or that relations with al-Sadr might break down once more. There is no doubt that the Administration’s plans for the aftermath of “victory” were poorly developed, that there were too few troops to carry out this phase, that the economic development effort, the arms available to American troops, the training of Iraqi security forces, and the incarceration and treatment of Iraqis captured in war or on the streets were so incompetently administered as to verge on criminality. Yet this does not mean that the probability of a reasonably successful outcome is below 50%. I suspect it is well above that. The hatred many of us have for the Administration should not be allowed to obscure the responsibility of observers to take careful and frequent readings of the course of events, and to adjust their judgments as new information comes in.
In today’s Times, Bob Herbert’s Op-Ed represents another example of the dark side of the liberal critique of the Bush Administration. Herbert tells us that “we find we can’t win this war we started”. Further down the page Herbert writes “As for the rebuilding of Iraq, forget about it.” These may appear to be brave words to Herbert’s admirers. They were words I might have written last April when it appeared our forces were entering the retreat phase of Napoleon’s invasion of Russia.
But today they no longer make sense. If we concentrate on the horror, on the repeated suicide bombings and mortar attacks, and mines along the roads, the picture can look black. But if we notice how these incidents have become more and more concentrated in the Sunni Arab areas, if we read reports detailing small gains here and there, of water systems reestablished, of electricity production which is now considerably above the level when we attacked, of schools that have been renovated, we will draw a different picture. If we note that the program of turning in weapons by the Mahdi Army is now being extended from Sadr City to other Shi’a areas in Iraq, we will see hope once more building. If we note the Shi’a majority in the South and the Kurdish enclaves in the North are expected to vote heavily in January, this will give another picture.
There is no doubt that the situation is still perilous, that the Sunni Arabs might be able to keep the insurgency up for months, or that relations with al-Sadr might break down once more. There is no doubt that the Administration’s plans for the aftermath of “victory” were poorly developed, that there were too few troops to carry out this phase, that the economic development effort, the arms available to American troops, the training of Iraqi security forces, and the incarceration and treatment of Iraqis captured in war or on the streets were so incompetently administered as to verge on criminality. Yet this does not mean that the probability of a reasonably successful outcome is below 50%. I suspect it is well above that. The hatred many of us have for the Administration should not be allowed to obscure the responsibility of observers to take careful and frequent readings of the course of events, and to adjust their judgments as new information comes in.
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