Friday, October 15, 2004
Definitions and Redefinitions of the Enemy in Iraq
The last week has brought more information confirming the basic direction of the Iraq insurgency and our chances to overcome it. On both sides, the battle seems more than ever to have settled down to be one between the government and the Americans, assisted by the Shi’a establishment and the Kurds on the one side, and the nationalists, Baathists, and Muslim extremists within the Sunni Arab population on the other.
The Shi’a establishment has long been pushing for the January vote. Now it is starting a campaign to get persons in all communities to vote in large numbers to ensure the legitimacy of the vote. Muqtada al-Sadr’s followers are continuing to hand over their heavier weapons (for a fee) and there is more and more talk of their leader joining the political process. Of course, terrorism continues and the American bombing and clearing operations continue, but these are more and more directed at the Sunni Arab community whose ostensible leaders seem unable to rein in the attacks. Current estimates are that about half of the Sunni Arabs would vote is they had a peaceful opportunity. But whether they will get this level of security by voting day in January is still unclear.
The picture is muddled by the fact that the Allawi government has interfered in the process of vetting former Baath party members to the extent that some Shi’a are saying that he is intent on establishing a new Baath government that will once again dominate the country. This is ominous since to do it he will have to short-circuit the election process and establish another authoritarian state. However, a more favorable view of what he is doing is that he is trying to improve his relation to the insurgent Sunni Arab community by bringing more of their real and potential leaders back into the mainstream.
Today’s paper includes a long op-ed arguing that the United States and the Iraqi government is making a mistake by continuing to try to isolate al-Sadr and Ahmad Chalabi. (It is a Chalabi commission whose function it was to carefully screen former Baathist officials that the government is now by-passing by adopting a faster inclusion process.) The writer points out that Chalabi has managed in a few months to transform his role from that of a leader of an exile organization heavily supported by the United States to a leader of a federation of Shi’a organizations whose members see him both as the man responsible for eliminating Saddam (whether he brought on the American attack with lies is immaterial to them) and the defender of populist Shi’as, such as al-Sadr, and an intermediary with al-Sistani and Iran (where he now has a home). The fact that the Americans and Allawi and many Sunni Arabs hate him is seen as a plus by his supporters. The op-ed writer argues that it is with this Chalabi, not the one who may have misused funds in Jordan and Iraq, or misled the Pentagon, that we must learn to cooperate if we are to be seen as an impartial and supportive party in bringing democracy to Iraq.
This is correct. The United States must get out of the habit of picking favorites and supporting them to the detriment of others if we are to play a positive role in democratization in Iraq or elsewhere. The faster we are able to overcome our prejudices and learn to see situations through local eyes the better.
The Shi’a establishment has long been pushing for the January vote. Now it is starting a campaign to get persons in all communities to vote in large numbers to ensure the legitimacy of the vote. Muqtada al-Sadr’s followers are continuing to hand over their heavier weapons (for a fee) and there is more and more talk of their leader joining the political process. Of course, terrorism continues and the American bombing and clearing operations continue, but these are more and more directed at the Sunni Arab community whose ostensible leaders seem unable to rein in the attacks. Current estimates are that about half of the Sunni Arabs would vote is they had a peaceful opportunity. But whether they will get this level of security by voting day in January is still unclear.
The picture is muddled by the fact that the Allawi government has interfered in the process of vetting former Baath party members to the extent that some Shi’a are saying that he is intent on establishing a new Baath government that will once again dominate the country. This is ominous since to do it he will have to short-circuit the election process and establish another authoritarian state. However, a more favorable view of what he is doing is that he is trying to improve his relation to the insurgent Sunni Arab community by bringing more of their real and potential leaders back into the mainstream.
Today’s paper includes a long op-ed arguing that the United States and the Iraqi government is making a mistake by continuing to try to isolate al-Sadr and Ahmad Chalabi. (It is a Chalabi commission whose function it was to carefully screen former Baathist officials that the government is now by-passing by adopting a faster inclusion process.) The writer points out that Chalabi has managed in a few months to transform his role from that of a leader of an exile organization heavily supported by the United States to a leader of a federation of Shi’a organizations whose members see him both as the man responsible for eliminating Saddam (whether he brought on the American attack with lies is immaterial to them) and the defender of populist Shi’as, such as al-Sadr, and an intermediary with al-Sistani and Iran (where he now has a home). The fact that the Americans and Allawi and many Sunni Arabs hate him is seen as a plus by his supporters. The op-ed writer argues that it is with this Chalabi, not the one who may have misused funds in Jordan and Iraq, or misled the Pentagon, that we must learn to cooperate if we are to be seen as an impartial and supportive party in bringing democracy to Iraq.
This is correct. The United States must get out of the habit of picking favorites and supporting them to the detriment of others if we are to play a positive role in democratization in Iraq or elsewhere. The faster we are able to overcome our prejudices and learn to see situations through local eyes the better.
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