Friday, September 03, 2004
Scenarios for Iraq
Bob Herbert reports in today’s paper the statement of John McCain that our troops are likely to remain in Iraq for 10 to 20 years. Yet, sadly, no one else is telling the people the truth. He backs up his case by pointing to a “Briefing Paper” just released by the Royal Institute of International Affairs. (Click here to look at the study). Let us briefly summarize the three scenarios the Paper suggests.
(1) The “fragmentation scenario” which it considers the “default scenario”. The assumption is that the Shi’a, Sunni, and Kurdish elements of the population will work against one another’s interests to such an extent that the nation will slowly dissolve before the present political process comes to fruition. In this scenario opposition to American forces continues and grows, but not in a way that unites the disparate factions. The Kurds are scared of losing independence; the Sunnis are afraid of being overrun, the Shi’as are afraid that there is a Sunni-Baathist plot that will not allow their promised control of the country to be realized.
(2) The “Holding Together” scenario. Enough people will choose to work together to make it possible to establish a government on the projected model. This will occur only if the interim government and the Americans work effectively to block the fragmentation scenario.
(3) The “Regional Remake” scenario. The way I understand it, this could occur during or after the playing out of either of the first two. The Paper then goes on to detail the ways in which Iraq might become a fulcrum for re-forming the Middle East. If the Kurds end up essentially autonomous, his will reverberate through Iran, Turkey, and Syria. This may incite the Turks to invade, ostensibly to help their Turkoman relations in the Kirkuk area, but actually to block the spread of Kurdish nationalism by suppressing any quasi-independent Kurdistan. (However, elsewhere the Paper suggests that Turkey might be willing to accept an independent Kurdistan within Iraq if the alternative seemed to be a revived Shi’a or Sunni world pressing on its borders, as described below.) In this scenario, Najaf becomes the focus of a suddenly expansionist Shi’a world, in which the Shi’as of eastern Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, Lebanon and elsewhere change the directions of their loyalties. One interesting aspect of this scenario is that the Shi’a Ulema of Iran might fear a world in which Iranians could change the direction of their loyalties to the theologically higher ranked Najaf clergy. This might undermine the present Iranian regime, based as it is on a politically activist Shi’a doctrine that Sistani rejects. On the other hand, the Sunnis in the triangle in this scenario become the focus of an extremist salafist Islam that shakes the present boundaries of Sunnite states such as Saudi Arabia.
The Paper’s more general thesis is that Iraq threatens to fly apart. Even with the most careful military and diplomatic efforts, the best the Interim Government and the United States can hope for is a fragile state in which the parts are only held together with continuing difficulty. The Paper implies that there is a good chance the result will be much worse. However, Herbert’s belief that the Paper calls “full-fledged democracy” in Iraq “beyond belief” is not supported by the Briefing Paper. Of course, it will not be perfect Swiss or Icelandic democracy. Brazil and India, Taiwan and Argentina are also not that “full-fledged”. Countering pessimism about democracy is the strange fact that something like a European model of democracy might become the least common denominator for the groups that would participate in the “holding together” scenario. Personally, I think we should be happy enough if we could leave behind something like Putin’s Russia with a Kurdish Albania or Montenegro.
But let us return again to McCain and his ten to twenty years. Given these scenarios, with the least common denominator for the participants in all of them a desire to get the Americans out—except for the Kurds for whom we might end up a permanent protector (they wish!)—it seems to me McCain’s time schedule is a counsel of despair. If things do begin dragging out as he suggests, then some American President is going to simply take the troops out. Or if he does not, then he will be remaking America into a truly Imperialist state such as the American people are unlikely to understand or support. We might leave a small mission in there as a fire break for the Kurds, but beyond that I do not see a long mission.
(1) The “fragmentation scenario” which it considers the “default scenario”. The assumption is that the Shi’a, Sunni, and Kurdish elements of the population will work against one another’s interests to such an extent that the nation will slowly dissolve before the present political process comes to fruition. In this scenario opposition to American forces continues and grows, but not in a way that unites the disparate factions. The Kurds are scared of losing independence; the Sunnis are afraid of being overrun, the Shi’as are afraid that there is a Sunni-Baathist plot that will not allow their promised control of the country to be realized.
(2) The “Holding Together” scenario. Enough people will choose to work together to make it possible to establish a government on the projected model. This will occur only if the interim government and the Americans work effectively to block the fragmentation scenario.
(3) The “Regional Remake” scenario. The way I understand it, this could occur during or after the playing out of either of the first two. The Paper then goes on to detail the ways in which Iraq might become a fulcrum for re-forming the Middle East. If the Kurds end up essentially autonomous, his will reverberate through Iran, Turkey, and Syria. This may incite the Turks to invade, ostensibly to help their Turkoman relations in the Kirkuk area, but actually to block the spread of Kurdish nationalism by suppressing any quasi-independent Kurdistan. (However, elsewhere the Paper suggests that Turkey might be willing to accept an independent Kurdistan within Iraq if the alternative seemed to be a revived Shi’a or Sunni world pressing on its borders, as described below.) In this scenario, Najaf becomes the focus of a suddenly expansionist Shi’a world, in which the Shi’as of eastern Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, Lebanon and elsewhere change the directions of their loyalties. One interesting aspect of this scenario is that the Shi’a Ulema of Iran might fear a world in which Iranians could change the direction of their loyalties to the theologically higher ranked Najaf clergy. This might undermine the present Iranian regime, based as it is on a politically activist Shi’a doctrine that Sistani rejects. On the other hand, the Sunnis in the triangle in this scenario become the focus of an extremist salafist Islam that shakes the present boundaries of Sunnite states such as Saudi Arabia.
The Paper’s more general thesis is that Iraq threatens to fly apart. Even with the most careful military and diplomatic efforts, the best the Interim Government and the United States can hope for is a fragile state in which the parts are only held together with continuing difficulty. The Paper implies that there is a good chance the result will be much worse. However, Herbert’s belief that the Paper calls “full-fledged democracy” in Iraq “beyond belief” is not supported by the Briefing Paper. Of course, it will not be perfect Swiss or Icelandic democracy. Brazil and India, Taiwan and Argentina are also not that “full-fledged”. Countering pessimism about democracy is the strange fact that something like a European model of democracy might become the least common denominator for the groups that would participate in the “holding together” scenario. Personally, I think we should be happy enough if we could leave behind something like Putin’s Russia with a Kurdish Albania or Montenegro.
But let us return again to McCain and his ten to twenty years. Given these scenarios, with the least common denominator for the participants in all of them a desire to get the Americans out—except for the Kurds for whom we might end up a permanent protector (they wish!)—it seems to me McCain’s time schedule is a counsel of despair. If things do begin dragging out as he suggests, then some American President is going to simply take the troops out. Or if he does not, then he will be remaking America into a truly Imperialist state such as the American people are unlikely to understand or support. We might leave a small mission in there as a fire break for the Kurds, but beyond that I do not see a long mission.
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