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Friday, September 10, 2004

Preventing 9/11 Redux: Missed Opportunities 

An ABC report the other night on the vulnerability of American trains to terrorists reminded me once again of the missed opportunities for enhancing American security that have been occasioned by the ill-timed and ill-planned invasion of Iraq. ABC found that an explosive package could easily be placed in an upper bin on a train car and stay there without being noticed for hundreds of miles (for example, from New York to D.C.) No one was sent down the aisles during the course of most journeys across the country to even make a cursory search for such packages. The train administrator and others interviewed said "they simply did not have enough resources to do more".

Let us then do a little back of the envelope calculation. We have had and have about 140,000 military in Iraq. Let us imagine a situation without Iraq where government resources had instead been focused on homeland security and defeating al-Qaida. I would imagine that we would still have dispatched and kept a considerable force in the Persian Gulf, say 20,000. I think we would place in Afghanistan about 40,000 of this number (in addition to the sometimes 20,000 we have there now). Such a force would have a much better chance of capturing Osama and his chief lieutenants. It could better protect development projects throughout the country, and reduce the fears of voters in upcoming elections.

This leaves 80,000. Let us first set aside a fast reaction force of 20,000 for international emergencies as these come to be identified by the United Nations. This might include providing forces in Haitian crises or now perhaps in Darfur. Having such a force to help in international projects when needed would improve the global reputation of the United States, thereby improving access to intelligence developed by others. Then we might retrain and redeploy the remaining 60,000 for internal protection. This would allow us to greatly augment investigative forces on docks for baggage checking and at critical entry points into the United States. To return to our previous example, we could assign two men or women to major Amtrak or commuter trains, to make occasional walks up and down the aisles looking for anything suspicious. If we assume that half of the 60,000 could be assigned at any one time to such duty, this would mean that 15,000 trains that are now unprotected in any way could be covered in this manner every day. (This overkill. There are only 1400 amtrak and commuter trains in the Northeast running on any weekday.) This might not be the best way to use such a home security force. But the reader can easily see how it might reduce the pleas that no more can be done for protection because of "insufficient resources".

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