Iraq and Afghanistan

The Mujahedin-e-Khalq is a left-over Iranian leftist organization with a most chequered history. In the 1960s and 70s, the Mujahedin staged several small terrorist attacks within Iran. When the Shah was expelled from Iran, many observers imagined that the end of the Shah would mean a leftish Iran (we feared a communist). Certainly most of the middle class opposed to the Shah also thought so. However, soon, even the liberals were on the run and theocracy was established. The Mujahedin-e-Khalq were the last group to go under completely, after one last blood-letting in 1981 that left many of Khomeini’s men dead or injured. The remnants of the organization ended up, along with many real liberals, in the West, lobbying Americans, even Congress, for support against Tehran. Over the course of the next twenty years, two things happened. First, they evolved into a rather cultist organization that looked to its female leader as a kind of goddess (the leading “brother” and leading “sister” married in grand ceremony, but she seemed to come out on top). Second, their activity came to be centered on a military wing supplied and supported by Saddam in Iraq. Toward the end of the Iran-Iraq War they were armed by Saddam and sent into battle. They later helped Saddam put down the Shi’a and Kurdish revolts after the first Gulf War. This record probably destroyed most of the lingering support of Iranians outside their own ranks, but helped them with some Americans who wanted to be sure that Iran was held in check.

Nevertheless, when after the war the United States came to listing groups throughout the world as terrorist, the Mujahedin ended up on the list. They did, in fact, continue to sporadically engage in terrorist activities in Iran and around the world (especially against Iranian missions). Whether they should be listed as a terrorist organization has, however, remained a contentious issue, even within Congress. But they stayed on the list. So at the beginning of the latest Iraq war we bombed their camps and our intention was to arrest them. However, apparently because they appeared to have some possible value to us in the future, we made an agreement to simply disarm them, leaving them in their camps.

Now we would like the Iranian government to turn over a number of top al-Qaida people that they hold. Iran says “Fine, as long as you give us the Mujahedin leaders” (I do not know how many they want.) Here there is a standoff. There is a group within the United States government, the neocons, which Juan Cole says are closely connected to the Israeli lobby, that wants to maintain the Mujahedin as a threat to Iran, and as a possible source of support in some future invasion or sponsored revolution. (If this is the reason, it seems foolish, because I suspect they would discredit any revolution or invasion more than they would help.) So far, this group has successfully argued against handing them over. This also points to the obvious: ours is not a “war on terror” as much as a “war on whomever it seems in our interest right now to label a terrorist”.

Although it seems foolish to not take the opportunity to get our hands on the al-Qaida leaders just because we are reluctant to hand over Mujahedin who are ideologically as far from us as Tehran, there is a dilemma here for any government attempting to stick to principles (either out of moral scruples or a desire for a better reputation). Should we be seen as handing over a group with whom we have worked out a deal to live in Iraq to a government that might well execute them for crimes against the state? Whatever else they may be, the Mujahedin are certainly now in the class “political refugees”, the kind of people that we often admit into the United States because of the danger they would be killed if they went home. Whether we will be able to protect them when and if a new Iraqi government gets around to considering their case remains unclear.