Iraq and Afghanistan

Noah Feldman, a noted authority on the current situation in Iraq, writes in Friday’s Op-Ed that elections in Iraq would be worse than useless if they take place without the Sunni Triangle’s full participation. His argument is several fold.

Feldman regards Sistani’s latest demand that the elections be held in January and that the government parties abandon the single list approach to be actually a bargaining ploy to strengthen the hand of his supporters in making election arrangements. Sistani believes that instead of the 55% Shi’a population that the list is being based on the real number is more like 70%. He wants the list to be based on 70%. Feldman points out that the January election is important because those elected will rewrite the constitution. Sistani intervenes because he wants the Shi’as to dominate that process. Turning to the Sunni, Feldman notes that they are used to running the country. They are also clearly able at this juncture to mount an effective insurgency. Were they to be left out of the election process, they would turn decisively against the democracy project and persist as an uncontrollable population in the heart of the country. Therefore, unifying the country will require both the suppression of the insurgency, proving the insurgents cannot win and “the carrot” of being offered an effective role in the political process. He believes this offer will be enough to get the Sunni clerics who have told their followers to sit out the election to change their minds. He realizes this will take some time, but believes it would be a disaster to not postpone the election until such time as the Sunnis are ready.

Whether Feldman is right or wrong depends in large part on what the country really looks like. If as Allawi and the American Administration claim, there are really only three provinces where elections could not be held today, that is one thing. But there is considerable dispute over where control is adequate and where it is not. Juan Cole’s position is that the elections now could only be held in only nine provinces: the three Kurdish provinces, Baghdad, and five provinces in the south (including Karbala and Basra). Cole’s position on Baghdad is unclear because he says that Allawi included Baghdad in the three no-goes where elections could still not be held, and Cole certainly is aware of lack of control in much of Baghdad. Perhaps Cole’s map where he shows Baghdad white is simply a mistake. One thing to remember is that out of a population of about 25 million, 6 million live in the Baghdad region. So if that is in the pacified area, great, but if it remains out in the cold as Allawi and others say now (and as I would guess from the news), then it is hard to see how a “national election” could be out.

Perhaps the greatest objection to the Feldman approach is that it is unclear why the Sunnis would ever “come in out of the cold”. They will lose control no matter how the constitution is written, if it is at all democratic. Moreover, for whatever reasons, they hate Americans and those who cooperate with them. This unfortunate hatred cannot be wished away. The longer the war goes on in the Sunni Triangle, the more Sunnis are killed, and the more individual Sunnis come to feel the need for revenge against the Americans and their allies. I do not see how “suppression” under these conditions will produce a country ready for a democratic vote.