Iraq and Afghanistan

Today for the first time, Rumsfeld and company admitted that things were not all they should be in Iraq. They are worried about not meeting the political timetable. This was strongly reinforced by a segment of the Lehrer show in which two military authorities (retired generals) discussed what is happening. They were both very negative. They do not see the new Iraqi forces being able to do anything any time soon. They note that a number of cities are out of control and they do not see how they will be brought under control in time for the elections. They noted the steady increase in attacks on Americans and the destruction of pipelines. They noted the improvement in both the arms and the tactics of the insurgents. These men (and other experts, I am summarizing from both news and TV here) did not feel that there was widespread cooperation between Shi’a and Sunni, but they did say that many now see Baathist seculars and the religious extremists cooperating in their attacks on Americans. One sign of this is that the extremists have pulled away from the imposition of Taliban-style Islamic rules in the cities under insurgent control (apparently to satisfy the Baathists).

The experts were asked what is to be done. Their answer was essentially that there was nothing to be done. We could do marginal things, but the implication was that the flow of events was against us. They agreed that the enemy for too many Iraqis has become the existence of American forces in their country. They did not see any change in the situation unless these forces left. Yet they also implied that if they left, “our Iraqis” could not handle the situation on their own.

This suggests that we are back in April 2004 where the name of the game again becomes finding an exit strategy. I suggest the reader review the posts during that period, particularly here. Of course, I overreacted then. Maybe I have again.

If there is a way out, it would seem to me to be a concentration on our strengths. We still have a significant portion of modernized Iraqis in Baghdad and other cities wanting to see the Interim Government and the Americans succeed. We still have the Kurds in the north. Most of the Shiites in the south are potentially on our side. They really do not want to cede the country to the Sunnis and Muqtada. Given this situation, two steps must be taken now. First, enlist the active help of the Kurdish forces outside their homeland. Second, arm the anti-Sadrist Shiite militias that existed in embryonic form formerly in the south. Given leadership and weapons and confidence they might turn the tide in the areas in which Shiites are in the majority, especially outside Baghdad. The great Shi’a divines do not want to see their chance for a successful Shiite state dribble away. But right now they and their followers do not have the confidence or weapons to act effectively. This approach must be buttressed by an American promise to stay only until (some benchmark here), thereby removing the accusation of treason that can be hurled against anyone who helps the Americans as long as they stay.