Sunday, September 05, 2004
Bargaining with Terrorists
A great deal of nonsense is written about bargaining with terrorists. Cheney tells us as so many do that there is no point in bargaining — "just kill them". In Iraq we have seen that bargaining is sometimes fruitful, sometimes not. The question, of course, is not the value of bargaining with an abstraction like terrorism or a generic class of people called "terrorists". We must be more specific. Before making too many generalizations we need to ask about which class of terrorists we are dealing with. Clearly in some cases bargaining with terrorists is not fruitful; also clearly in some cases, not bargaining with terrorists is equally unfruitful. Israel has had many years to bypass "bargaining" with its terrorists by "just killing them". It doesn't seem to work very well because there are too many Palestinians.
As a first cut at the problem, we must distinguish from all other terrorist groups those small cells, such as the "Red Brigades", that can actually be eliminated or reduced to ineffectiveness by police or military action. Groups that are based on a widespread disaffection within a population, such as that of Palestine, Chechnya, Iraq, or Ulster cannot in any simple sense be eliminated by force, except perhaps by actions bordering on a holocaust. Toughness in these situations can be counterproductive, can manufacture new terrorists as fast as they are eliminated. The people of a disaffected area (and this seldom means all or even most of the population of the area) may be remarkably resilient under pressure. The people who caused the recent Beslan school tragedy in the Caucasus apparently intended to be killed. No matter how tough the Russians might have been they could not have convinced these people. Very often, as we have seen, an accommodation occurs. This has happened in Algeria, in the Basque area of Spain, and in Ulster. The accommodation often does not end the story. Many remain dissatisfied. But it helps the society to carry on more peacefully than before. Even if the central government loses some of its values, as in Algeria, it is a useful way to cut its losses.
This suggests that in many situations the issue is not whether one can bargain with the terrorists but rather whether there is a terrorist support and recruiting community that can be affected by actions that a government can take. For example, al-Qaida exists against a background of consistent (from their perspective at least) American support of Israel in Palestine and of support by the United States of dictatorial regimes whose leaders live most unislamic lives (such as those of Saudi Arabia and the Gulf Emirates). If we were perceived to change these policies, over time the community of Muslims willing to support al-Qaida would wither. People now in al-Qaida might remain as fanatic as ever, but the level of recruitment and the funds available would decline. If a democratic government with minimal American influence were established in Iraq, then the support community would also decline. If we played a more positive role in the development and education of the Pakistani people, this would also reduce the number of people that became involved in terrorism.
To take an even more indirect tact, if we were able to help in the development of Muslim countries, so that their young people had greater hope for success in their lives, then the pool of potential terrorists would decline. All of these effects would be hard to trace and would occur over many years, but this does not affect the likelihood that they would "work".
Turning to more immediate, face-to-face, situations, we must again note differences. The Mahdi Army is an army of Shiites whose stated goal is the expulsion of Americans from Iraq. However, their goals are also more complicated. They include the increase of the power of their leader and increase of the power of the Shi'a in Iraq. Negotiators could (and I expect have) show them how these goals might be attained by easier means than blowing up people — and this might be done at the same time that American and Iraqi forces have shown them how hard success through arms alone will be. Many of the tribal and Sunni religious leaders can similarly be bargained with. However, terrorists who will only be satisfied by an extremist religious revolution in Iraq (a growing group) or an extremist nationalist revolution (probably a declining group) have goals so far from ours that there is little to bargain strategically about, although tactically in a situation such as Falluja we can of course bargain. For extremists the goal is to bring down the whole recovery enterprise by engendering as much violence and confusion as possible. But even here, by showing in the field that this goal is ultimately hopeless, we can dry up support and recruitment. This is not what is usually called "bargaining", but perhaps it should be included in the discussion.
As a first cut at the problem, we must distinguish from all other terrorist groups those small cells, such as the "Red Brigades", that can actually be eliminated or reduced to ineffectiveness by police or military action. Groups that are based on a widespread disaffection within a population, such as that of Palestine, Chechnya, Iraq, or Ulster cannot in any simple sense be eliminated by force, except perhaps by actions bordering on a holocaust. Toughness in these situations can be counterproductive, can manufacture new terrorists as fast as they are eliminated. The people of a disaffected area (and this seldom means all or even most of the population of the area) may be remarkably resilient under pressure. The people who caused the recent Beslan school tragedy in the Caucasus apparently intended to be killed. No matter how tough the Russians might have been they could not have convinced these people. Very often, as we have seen, an accommodation occurs. This has happened in Algeria, in the Basque area of Spain, and in Ulster. The accommodation often does not end the story. Many remain dissatisfied. But it helps the society to carry on more peacefully than before. Even if the central government loses some of its values, as in Algeria, it is a useful way to cut its losses.
This suggests that in many situations the issue is not whether one can bargain with the terrorists but rather whether there is a terrorist support and recruiting community that can be affected by actions that a government can take. For example, al-Qaida exists against a background of consistent (from their perspective at least) American support of Israel in Palestine and of support by the United States of dictatorial regimes whose leaders live most unislamic lives (such as those of Saudi Arabia and the Gulf Emirates). If we were perceived to change these policies, over time the community of Muslims willing to support al-Qaida would wither. People now in al-Qaida might remain as fanatic as ever, but the level of recruitment and the funds available would decline. If a democratic government with minimal American influence were established in Iraq, then the support community would also decline. If we played a more positive role in the development and education of the Pakistani people, this would also reduce the number of people that became involved in terrorism.
To take an even more indirect tact, if we were able to help in the development of Muslim countries, so that their young people had greater hope for success in their lives, then the pool of potential terrorists would decline. All of these effects would be hard to trace and would occur over many years, but this does not affect the likelihood that they would "work".
Turning to more immediate, face-to-face, situations, we must again note differences. The Mahdi Army is an army of Shiites whose stated goal is the expulsion of Americans from Iraq. However, their goals are also more complicated. They include the increase of the power of their leader and increase of the power of the Shi'a in Iraq. Negotiators could (and I expect have) show them how these goals might be attained by easier means than blowing up people — and this might be done at the same time that American and Iraqi forces have shown them how hard success through arms alone will be. Many of the tribal and Sunni religious leaders can similarly be bargained with. However, terrorists who will only be satisfied by an extremist religious revolution in Iraq (a growing group) or an extremist nationalist revolution (probably a declining group) have goals so far from ours that there is little to bargain strategically about, although tactically in a situation such as Falluja we can of course bargain. For extremists the goal is to bring down the whole recovery enterprise by engendering as much violence and confusion as possible. But even here, by showing in the field that this goal is ultimately hopeless, we can dry up support and recruitment. This is not what is usually called "bargaining", but perhaps it should be included in the discussion.
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