Wednesday, September 01, 2004
The 9/11 Report: "Dissent"
One of the best discussions of what is possible and what is not in the fight against terrorism is found in a book review of the 9/11 report by Richard Posner in last Sunday's NYT. He thinks it is surprisingly well written, with "riveting" narratives. However, he finds the analysis less than impressive and the recommendations largely mistaken. Indeed, he thinks the fact that the report emphasizes its recommendations vitiates the whole enterprise, for the analysis in a report so focused on recommendations is inevitably going to be recast to support the recommendations. "Combining an investigation of the attacks with proposals for preventing future attacks is the same mistake as combining intelligence with policy. The way a problem is described is bound to influence the choice of how to solve it". (I think he got the last sentence backwards, but never mind it goes both ways.)
His main propositions are that (1) there is little reason to believe that we could have prevented 9/11 with a better intelligence system, and (2) There is certainly little reason to believe that combining all intelligence agencies into one would help anything. In fact, he thinks it will lead to herd thinking that makes dissenters even more likely to be ignored than is true today. He believes that the desire for unanimity of Republicans and Democrats drove the Commission to end up blaming everyone in both administrations. It was forced to blame both Clinton and Bush administrations equally (an especially good point).
He sees nothing in the Report supporting the conclusion that 9/11 could have been prevented if we had had a better system. No intelligence system would have been able to put the bits and pieces of information together in time to prevent the attack, although it is easy enough to see how this might be done in retrospect. He argues that no novel attack of this type can ever be prevented. We are always protecting ourselves against the last attack and it cannot be otherwise. "No terrorist had hijacked an American commercial aircraft anywhere in the world since 1986." He points out that both the Clinton and Bush administrations had considered and to some degree acted on a variety of ways to control bin Ladin. In fact by the time the Bush people came in, "bin Ladin fatigue" had set in. He does not blame the Bush people, because he finds it only natural that a new administration should not adopt the same priorities in any area as the previous.
Posner points to a short list of actions that we could take to improve our defenses against Jihadist groups. They include better evacuation plans for major buildings, the more careful inspection of the papers of Muslims entering the country, more careful screening of airline passengers and baggage, stronger cockpit doors, ground control overrides for controlling airliners in emergencies, elimination go legal barriers to sharing information between the FBI and CIA, more training in relevant languages, and reassignment of federal agents assigned to the war on drugs to some aspect of the war on terrorism.
He also argues by implication that the FBI should be taken off the case. It is institutionally simply unable to operate against this kind of threat. It is a police department working for arrests and prosecutions and this culture appears unlikely to change. Information sharing within the FBI is at least as bad as that between agencies. Its antiquated equipment and the independence of its offices work against what is needed for the counterterrorist enterprise. He concludes that we need either to appoint a tough new manager that would really be able to change the way the Bureau operates or create a new agency analogous to the British Secret Service (MI5). The British MI5 and MI6 seem to work well together, have the same culture, and neither is involved in arrests. In any event, we clearly need an effective domestic intelligence agency.
Posner is particularly incensed by the argument that the reason the bits and pieces of intelligence were not put together in a timely fashion was that there was no one person in charge. There is simply too much information for any single or interconnected data base arrangement to handle it. There will always be some information that will not be shared for quite legitimate reasons. Because information is power, there will always be some hoarding of information within subunits no matter how centralized the system is in theory. In his view, efforts to centralize will lengthen the time that information takes to get to the President and will reduce the number of alternatives that he is presented with. He sees the "National Intelligence Director in continuous conflict with the Attorney General, the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Secretary of Homeland Security, and the National Security Advisor."
Posner is an opponent of proposals for centralization throughout his critique. One more arrow is shot at the idea that the paramilitary operations of the CIA should be folded into the Department of Defense. He thinks that the CIA has a more flexible structure and can do things that the DoD cannot. We now have multiple forces in addition to the CIA's Special Activities Division. They are all useful, giving administrations more flexibility in confronting crises.
The author frequently returns to the proposition that even if all the right steps are taken, we will only reduce slightly the probability of another 9/11 type event. The Report does not demonstrate that the system did not respond well before 9/11. The problem was in the nature of the threat, not the system it confronted.
His main propositions are that (1) there is little reason to believe that we could have prevented 9/11 with a better intelligence system, and (2) There is certainly little reason to believe that combining all intelligence agencies into one would help anything. In fact, he thinks it will lead to herd thinking that makes dissenters even more likely to be ignored than is true today. He believes that the desire for unanimity of Republicans and Democrats drove the Commission to end up blaming everyone in both administrations. It was forced to blame both Clinton and Bush administrations equally (an especially good point).
He sees nothing in the Report supporting the conclusion that 9/11 could have been prevented if we had had a better system. No intelligence system would have been able to put the bits and pieces of information together in time to prevent the attack, although it is easy enough to see how this might be done in retrospect. He argues that no novel attack of this type can ever be prevented. We are always protecting ourselves against the last attack and it cannot be otherwise. "No terrorist had hijacked an American commercial aircraft anywhere in the world since 1986." He points out that both the Clinton and Bush administrations had considered and to some degree acted on a variety of ways to control bin Ladin. In fact by the time the Bush people came in, "bin Ladin fatigue" had set in. He does not blame the Bush people, because he finds it only natural that a new administration should not adopt the same priorities in any area as the previous.
Posner points to a short list of actions that we could take to improve our defenses against Jihadist groups. They include better evacuation plans for major buildings, the more careful inspection of the papers of Muslims entering the country, more careful screening of airline passengers and baggage, stronger cockpit doors, ground control overrides for controlling airliners in emergencies, elimination go legal barriers to sharing information between the FBI and CIA, more training in relevant languages, and reassignment of federal agents assigned to the war on drugs to some aspect of the war on terrorism.
He also argues by implication that the FBI should be taken off the case. It is institutionally simply unable to operate against this kind of threat. It is a police department working for arrests and prosecutions and this culture appears unlikely to change. Information sharing within the FBI is at least as bad as that between agencies. Its antiquated equipment and the independence of its offices work against what is needed for the counterterrorist enterprise. He concludes that we need either to appoint a tough new manager that would really be able to change the way the Bureau operates or create a new agency analogous to the British Secret Service (MI5). The British MI5 and MI6 seem to work well together, have the same culture, and neither is involved in arrests. In any event, we clearly need an effective domestic intelligence agency.
Posner is particularly incensed by the argument that the reason the bits and pieces of intelligence were not put together in a timely fashion was that there was no one person in charge. There is simply too much information for any single or interconnected data base arrangement to handle it. There will always be some information that will not be shared for quite legitimate reasons. Because information is power, there will always be some hoarding of information within subunits no matter how centralized the system is in theory. In his view, efforts to centralize will lengthen the time that information takes to get to the President and will reduce the number of alternatives that he is presented with. He sees the "National Intelligence Director in continuous conflict with the Attorney General, the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Secretary of Homeland Security, and the National Security Advisor."
Posner is an opponent of proposals for centralization throughout his critique. One more arrow is shot at the idea that the paramilitary operations of the CIA should be folded into the Department of Defense. He thinks that the CIA has a more flexible structure and can do things that the DoD cannot. We now have multiple forces in addition to the CIA's Special Activities Division. They are all useful, giving administrations more flexibility in confronting crises.
The author frequently returns to the proposition that even if all the right steps are taken, we will only reduce slightly the probability of another 9/11 type event. The Report does not demonstrate that the system did not respond well before 9/11. The problem was in the nature of the threat, not the system it confronted.
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