Monday, August 09, 2004
The War with the Mahdi Army: An End Game?
The United States and the Interim Government, personified by PM Allawi and the Governor of Najaf, have apparently decided once and for all to destroy the Mahdi Army of Muqtada al-Sadr. They may be succeeding in the South, unfortunately at the cost of many lives and much destruction in central Najaf. We do not hear a great deal about successes against the Mahdi Army in Baghdad. There may in fact be more than one "army", or at least the Sadrist organization is not tightly controlled. In any event, both sides have called somewhat theatrically for a war to the death.
What are we to make of this? My analysis has been that the Shi'a have much more to gain from a successful completion of the planned road to democracy than from continued fighting. Muqtada may feel, however, that the only chance for him is to make the country into a theatre for holy war before the democratic process in completed. He would then hope to emerge as a national hero who would be able to control the country, either in the traditional manner of a Middle Eastern despot or through the new democratic institutions. If Muqtada takes this approach, he would be assuming that without a holy war the more traditional and majority Shi'a parties would continue to reject him. We should note that the other Shi'a parties came together in the last few days in Karbala to condemn the fighting in Najaf and to condemn the Americans and the government. This may or may not signify a change of heart for these parties.
Another analysis would hearken back to Juan Cole's suggestion that Allawi (in spite of his Shi'a origins) may in fact want to establish something like a new Baath regime relying on the Sunni neighbors of Iraq for support. This would explain why he has been negotiating recently with his Arab neighbors while refusing to negotiate with Iran, which he condemns for interfering in Iraq's affairs. This explanation becomes a little more plausible when we note the criminal charges now being hurled at Chalabi and his nephew. Remember that although Chalabi was originally introduced to Americans as the darling of the Pentagon, he has also become increasing close to the Iranians. Indeed, he has been accused of passing state secrets to the Iranians. (He also appears to have recently purchased a vacation house above Tehran.)
This tangled tale becomes even more confused by the renewed drumbeat of accusations being hurled at the Iranians by the American government. These have included an accusation that they have allowed al-Qaida operatives to pass through the country. We have now also renewed our demand that Iran end its nuclear weapons program, a demand that may have a threat hidden there somewhere. It has been said that the real reason we are so determined to check the Iranian nuclear development (rather than the equally dangerous North Korean) is that Israel demands that we either stop it or they will (with an aerial attack such as they made on Iraq's earlier capacity much earlier).
All this is possible. But I do not see how the United States would be able to present to the world acquiescence in actions that would in effect scrap democratic development in Iraq in favor of a new authoritarian state. Of course, Egyptian-style elections with foregone conclusions could be held. But applying this fig leaf might be hard with everyone watching. I still think that such an abandonment of our original policy to bring democracy to the area would be unlikely even in the cynical world of high politics. But it could happen. Or at least this scenario may be what many Iraqis Shiites are beginning to fear.
The United States and the Interim Government, personified by PM Allawi and the Governor of Najaf, have apparently decided once and for all to destroy the Mahdi Army of Muqtada al-Sadr. They may be succeeding in the South, unfortunately at the cost of many lives and much destruction in central Najaf. We do not hear a great deal about successes against the Mahdi Army in Baghdad. There may in fact be more than one "army", or at least the Sadrist organization is not tightly controlled. In any event, both sides have called somewhat theatrically for a war to the death.
What are we to make of this? My analysis has been that the Shi'a have much more to gain from a successful completion of the planned road to democracy than from continued fighting. Muqtada may feel, however, that the only chance for him is to make the country into a theatre for holy war before the democratic process in completed. He would then hope to emerge as a national hero who would be able to control the country, either in the traditional manner of a Middle Eastern despot or through the new democratic institutions. If Muqtada takes this approach, he would be assuming that without a holy war the more traditional and majority Shi'a parties would continue to reject him. We should note that the other Shi'a parties came together in the last few days in Karbala to condemn the fighting in Najaf and to condemn the Americans and the government. This may or may not signify a change of heart for these parties.
Another analysis would hearken back to Juan Cole's suggestion that Allawi (in spite of his Shi'a origins) may in fact want to establish something like a new Baath regime relying on the Sunni neighbors of Iraq for support. This would explain why he has been negotiating recently with his Arab neighbors while refusing to negotiate with Iran, which he condemns for interfering in Iraq's affairs. This explanation becomes a little more plausible when we note the criminal charges now being hurled at Chalabi and his nephew. Remember that although Chalabi was originally introduced to Americans as the darling of the Pentagon, he has also become increasing close to the Iranians. Indeed, he has been accused of passing state secrets to the Iranians. (He also appears to have recently purchased a vacation house above Tehran.)
This tangled tale becomes even more confused by the renewed drumbeat of accusations being hurled at the Iranians by the American government. These have included an accusation that they have allowed al-Qaida operatives to pass through the country. We have now also renewed our demand that Iran end its nuclear weapons program, a demand that may have a threat hidden there somewhere. It has been said that the real reason we are so determined to check the Iranian nuclear development (rather than the equally dangerous North Korean) is that Israel demands that we either stop it or they will (with an aerial attack such as they made on Iraq's earlier capacity much earlier).
All this is possible. But I do not see how the United States would be able to present to the world acquiescence in actions that would in effect scrap democratic development in Iraq in favor of a new authoritarian state. Of course, Egyptian-style elections with foregone conclusions could be held. But applying this fig leaf might be hard with everyone watching. I still think that such an abandonment of our original policy to bring democracy to the area would be unlikely even in the cynical world of high politics. But it could happen. Or at least this scenario may be what many Iraqis Shiites are beginning to fear.
Comments:
Post a Comment
Links to this post:
