Sunday, August 29, 2004
Two Iraqs
Today's paper suggests once again that there are really two quite dissimilar Iraqs. What the Americans do to assist the government in the one may do little to solve the problems of the other.
The first is the larger part of the country in which the "Coalition forces" and the government seem to be able to govern and operate with some effectiveness most of the time. This includes most of the Shi'a areas, the Kurdish area, and most of Baghdad (at least outside Sadr City). This is the area that made possible the recent "elections". I note in the NYT letter column recently that a Kurdish representative highly praised this process, so presumably they are on board (at least for now). The peace agreement, however doubtful, in Najaf has for the moment removed a great burden from the shoulders of the government and the Americans. No longer do the Americans risk being involved in the destruction of the most holy of Shiite shrines. If Sadr removes his troops from Najaf (which he seems to have done) and Kufa (part of the agreement, but we are not sure), it will be a victory for the government. If he still maintains his forces in Sadr City and elsewhere, it will be unfortunate. Yet the events of the past few days show that he can be talked to. He certainly does not have the Shiites uniformly behind him. Again we must remember that for the recent Conference 1100 (the Kurds says 1300) delegates from all over the country were able to convene in Baghdad for a few days (and therefore get in and out of the city and the meeting hall). It was a heavily protected area, but still it happened.
Unfortunately in a large part of the Sunni triangle, in Falluja, Ramadi and elsewhere (mostly in what is called Anbar Province) the Jihadists seem to have won out, driving out both former Baathist leaders or killing them, and doing the same to government appointees (in so far as these were not the same). Executions have become a regular event, often videotaped. The Governor's sons were kidnapped in Ramadi and the Governor was made to confess on video that he had been a traitor to Islam. The so-called Falluja Brigade that was supposed to secure order in Falluja has disintegrated. The situation is so bad that a new governor of Anbar has not been appointed. The leader in Falluja is supposedly a Sunni divine named Janabi, but the hand of Zarqawi seems to be behind much of it. From the government perspective, the only potentially bright side is that these fanatics are also devoted anti-Shiites.
Allawi and the Americans continue to temporize, protecting in this area little more than their stationed forces. Right now they are relying on Janabi's promise to the area's sheikhs not to make more attacks on the Americans. In addition, the Americans are concentrating on reducing the movement of people into and out of the area, particularly to Baghdad. I do not, incidentally, see how supplies could still be coming in from Jordan unless these fanatics are open to a good deal of bribery themselves. (One must never be sure that the reporters of this situation have not overshot the mark a little in trying to make Americans understand the situation is not as Rumsfeld paints it.)
What to do? Because of the lack of sufficient men and materiel, the Coalition and the government simply cannot control the whole country at this point. So they must try quarantines. They should try to define and defend with local and national help perhaps three-quarters of the country, including most of Baghdad. In heavily disputed areas, they should continue aggressive patrolling to establish or maintain a presence (thereby not abandoning people in these areas still on the government's side). If they can establish a semi-reliable peace in this "Iraq", and this peace must include satisfying the Kurds for now (we could use their Sunni Pesh-Murga in the rest of Iraq if they were satisfied there was little threat at home), then Iraq can pursue its political calendar, possibly leaving at voting time a few empty seats for areas out of control and therefore not able to vote. After some success in this "Iraq", the government could proceed to bargain/force the areas outside of control into the system, taking them on one by one. Of course, some of their leaders would be considered incorrigibles and would need eventually to be arrested. We could also expect some continued violence long after "victory" in this new campaign is declared, just as the Taliban (which they model themselves after) has continued its attacks in Afghanistan.
The first is the larger part of the country in which the "Coalition forces" and the government seem to be able to govern and operate with some effectiveness most of the time. This includes most of the Shi'a areas, the Kurdish area, and most of Baghdad (at least outside Sadr City). This is the area that made possible the recent "elections". I note in the NYT letter column recently that a Kurdish representative highly praised this process, so presumably they are on board (at least for now). The peace agreement, however doubtful, in Najaf has for the moment removed a great burden from the shoulders of the government and the Americans. No longer do the Americans risk being involved in the destruction of the most holy of Shiite shrines. If Sadr removes his troops from Najaf (which he seems to have done) and Kufa (part of the agreement, but we are not sure), it will be a victory for the government. If he still maintains his forces in Sadr City and elsewhere, it will be unfortunate. Yet the events of the past few days show that he can be talked to. He certainly does not have the Shiites uniformly behind him. Again we must remember that for the recent Conference 1100 (the Kurds says 1300) delegates from all over the country were able to convene in Baghdad for a few days (and therefore get in and out of the city and the meeting hall). It was a heavily protected area, but still it happened.
Unfortunately in a large part of the Sunni triangle, in Falluja, Ramadi and elsewhere (mostly in what is called Anbar Province) the Jihadists seem to have won out, driving out both former Baathist leaders or killing them, and doing the same to government appointees (in so far as these were not the same). Executions have become a regular event, often videotaped. The Governor's sons were kidnapped in Ramadi and the Governor was made to confess on video that he had been a traitor to Islam. The so-called Falluja Brigade that was supposed to secure order in Falluja has disintegrated. The situation is so bad that a new governor of Anbar has not been appointed. The leader in Falluja is supposedly a Sunni divine named Janabi, but the hand of Zarqawi seems to be behind much of it. From the government perspective, the only potentially bright side is that these fanatics are also devoted anti-Shiites.
Allawi and the Americans continue to temporize, protecting in this area little more than their stationed forces. Right now they are relying on Janabi's promise to the area's sheikhs not to make more attacks on the Americans. In addition, the Americans are concentrating on reducing the movement of people into and out of the area, particularly to Baghdad. I do not, incidentally, see how supplies could still be coming in from Jordan unless these fanatics are open to a good deal of bribery themselves. (One must never be sure that the reporters of this situation have not overshot the mark a little in trying to make Americans understand the situation is not as Rumsfeld paints it.)
What to do? Because of the lack of sufficient men and materiel, the Coalition and the government simply cannot control the whole country at this point. So they must try quarantines. They should try to define and defend with local and national help perhaps three-quarters of the country, including most of Baghdad. In heavily disputed areas, they should continue aggressive patrolling to establish or maintain a presence (thereby not abandoning people in these areas still on the government's side). If they can establish a semi-reliable peace in this "Iraq", and this peace must include satisfying the Kurds for now (we could use their Sunni Pesh-Murga in the rest of Iraq if they were satisfied there was little threat at home), then Iraq can pursue its political calendar, possibly leaving at voting time a few empty seats for areas out of control and therefore not able to vote. After some success in this "Iraq", the government could proceed to bargain/force the areas outside of control into the system, taking them on one by one. Of course, some of their leaders would be considered incorrigibles and would need eventually to be arrested. We could also expect some continued violence long after "victory" in this new campaign is declared, just as the Taliban (which they model themselves after) has continued its attacks in Afghanistan.
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