Sunday, August 29, 2004
Tanks and Modern Warfare
Today's NYT has an analysis of the use of tanks in Najaf. It seems that contrary to the assumption of the planners, and specifically Rumsfeld, army tanks turned out to be the key element in the "victory" of American forces in the city. The Mahdi Army could compete with the Marines to some extent, but they found the tanks unstoppable. The article suggests there is going to be some rethinking in a Washington that had envisioned a future dominated by light units backed up by highly accurate airpower.
This revives an old argument going back at least to the years after World War II. It was clear that in the two world wars, tanks were indispensable for major battles on open battlefields. One thing was clear: the only effective way to oppose tanks was with an effective tank force. Doubts have long been expressed about how effective tanks are in confined spaces, such as dense urban areas. Later tanks were seen as obsolete when facing powerful, small, often shoulder-fired weapons able to penetrate armor. The value of the tank seemed further diminished by the use of increasingly accurate air power. Yet, when the North Vietnamese overwhelmed South Vietnam, it was with a tank attack.
The issue is partly psychological. I am told by those who have experienced it, that soldiers in battle who see a tank coming at them tend to run for cover. However, some soldiers or guerillas have gotten sufficiently used to tanks that they are able to dart out with bombs etc. at the last minute in a confined environment (city or dense forest) and disable a tank. This does not see to have been the case for the Mahdi Army.
In judging this issue, three points should be remembered. First, new theories of ways to fight battles with fewer troops and weapons should always be looked carefully. Second, if a projected opponent does not have tanks, one of the critical reasons for needing a large force evaporates. Third, tanks that do not have to operate in an area where there is danger of aerial attack have an advantage which they would not have if they faced a force as modernized as themselves. This has certainly been true of our tanks in Iraq.
This revives an old argument going back at least to the years after World War II. It was clear that in the two world wars, tanks were indispensable for major battles on open battlefields. One thing was clear: the only effective way to oppose tanks was with an effective tank force. Doubts have long been expressed about how effective tanks are in confined spaces, such as dense urban areas. Later tanks were seen as obsolete when facing powerful, small, often shoulder-fired weapons able to penetrate armor. The value of the tank seemed further diminished by the use of increasingly accurate air power. Yet, when the North Vietnamese overwhelmed South Vietnam, it was with a tank attack.
The issue is partly psychological. I am told by those who have experienced it, that soldiers in battle who see a tank coming at them tend to run for cover. However, some soldiers or guerillas have gotten sufficiently used to tanks that they are able to dart out with bombs etc. at the last minute in a confined environment (city or dense forest) and disable a tank. This does not see to have been the case for the Mahdi Army.
In judging this issue, three points should be remembered. First, new theories of ways to fight battles with fewer troops and weapons should always be looked carefully. Second, if a projected opponent does not have tanks, one of the critical reasons for needing a large force evaporates. Third, tanks that do not have to operate in an area where there is danger of aerial attack have an advantage which they would not have if they faced a force as modernized as themselves. This has certainly been true of our tanks in Iraq.
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