Monday, August 09, 2004
Security of Transport: Continued Failure in Iraq
This morning's Times gives us a detailed account of the problems of trucking on the main artery between Jordan and Baghdad, one of the most important routes for the movement of both civilian and military supplies. While the account relies heavily on anecdotal evidence, it strikes the reader as only too believable. Jordanians make up the bulk of the drivers and their organizations are now advising their drivers that the trips are too dangerous. Many drivers have been stopped more than once before they decided to quit. Those who intercept the trucks roughly fall into three groups. The first includes insurgents intent on stopping all traffic. The second includes insurgents intent on stopping the carrying of supplies only to the Americans. (They frequently ask to see evidence of where the goods are being taken, evidence that may or may not be believed.) The third is made up of highway robbers with simpler objectives. These groups are not clearly identified: some of the insurgents are not averse to making a profit.
The highway is apparently still in reasonably good condition, unlike so many in the developing world. Like a superhighway, it generally goes near but not through cities. The police and security forces along the highway appear to be scattered and outnumbered, seldom emerging from their checkpoints. (When American patrols appear, the hijackers flee, but this is not often). The American Embassy is aware that many drivers have been killed or kidnapped bringing in American goods, but its officials make little effort to ease the pain for the drivers or their families.
This is another priority mission that we are either unable to undertake because of lack of resources or are foolishly ignoring. It would not seem impossible to maintain at least a daylight aerial surveillance of this and other major arteries, with high level reconnaissance planes supplemented by quick reaction helicopters. We might even consider a convoying system such as we had across the Atlantic in two wars. Whatever the answer, responding effectively to this problem would seem to be a great deal easier than sorting out the relations of Shi'a and Sunni factions.
This morning's Times gives us a detailed account of the problems of trucking on the main artery between Jordan and Baghdad, one of the most important routes for the movement of both civilian and military supplies. While the account relies heavily on anecdotal evidence, it strikes the reader as only too believable. Jordanians make up the bulk of the drivers and their organizations are now advising their drivers that the trips are too dangerous. Many drivers have been stopped more than once before they decided to quit. Those who intercept the trucks roughly fall into three groups. The first includes insurgents intent on stopping all traffic. The second includes insurgents intent on stopping the carrying of supplies only to the Americans. (They frequently ask to see evidence of where the goods are being taken, evidence that may or may not be believed.) The third is made up of highway robbers with simpler objectives. These groups are not clearly identified: some of the insurgents are not averse to making a profit.
The highway is apparently still in reasonably good condition, unlike so many in the developing world. Like a superhighway, it generally goes near but not through cities. The police and security forces along the highway appear to be scattered and outnumbered, seldom emerging from their checkpoints. (When American patrols appear, the hijackers flee, but this is not often). The American Embassy is aware that many drivers have been killed or kidnapped bringing in American goods, but its officials make little effort to ease the pain for the drivers or their families.
This is another priority mission that we are either unable to undertake because of lack of resources or are foolishly ignoring. It would not seem impossible to maintain at least a daylight aerial surveillance of this and other major arteries, with high level reconnaissance planes supplemented by quick reaction helicopters. We might even consider a convoying system such as we had across the Atlantic in two wars. Whatever the answer, responding effectively to this problem would seem to be a great deal easier than sorting out the relations of Shi'a and Sunni factions.
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