Saturday, August 07, 2004
Positive and Negative Trends and Contingency Plans
On August 6, the two most liberal Op-Ed columnists in the New York Times weighed in again on the side of pessimism on Iraqi outcomes. They both feel that the continued violence after the setting up of the interim government means that we are still sliding downhill toward a disaster. They are incensed that no one seems willing to admit to what is happening, or realizing the situation, able to come up with policies that might reverse the trends.
In our view, they are partly right and partly wrong. They are right in that there has been a continuation of violent attacks, the casualties continue to pile up, particularly of Iraqis of all stripes (police, insurgents, "civilians"). The collapse of the cease fire with the Mahdi Army is certainly a setback, as is the breakdown of the arrangements in Falluja (resulting in essentially an armed standoff between American forces on the outside of the city and insurgents of various varieties inside). Many other towns continue to be struck with suicide or roadside attacks even outside of the Sunni Triangle, especially in the Mosul area in the North. Kidnapping and holding for ransom under the threat of execution has become a common and to some extent effective tactic of at least some insurgent groups.
But the critics are wrong in not weighing the importance of positive changes in their accounting. There has been a steady increase in the participation and effectiveness of Iraqi police and other security units in the clashes that have occurred. The Americans are initiating less actions, staying mostly in their camps as a reaction force. (I see this as positive, they see this as negative.) There has been a revival of the Iraqi judicial and legal system, remarkable not in the pervasiveness of the revival but in the fact that judges and lawyers in some districts are able to go about their business with some confidence. The process leading toward an Iraqi government is continuing to unfold, even if unsteadily. The Interim Government is not as clearly independent of the Americans, or receiving as much support from the Iraqi people, as we would all like. But it is in business; it is developing an international presence; and leaders throughout the Middle East are coming to regard this government as the Government of Iraq. And, the point that we have repeatedly made in these pages, the insurgents seem deeply divided and without any clear picture of what they would like to see happen if the Americans and their "puppets" are defeated.
There is certainly enough in the arguments of the liberal editors to cause the United States to reexamine its policies, and to at least have contingency plans if things do fall apart again to the extent that they did in April. One can only hope that we have not put all our eggs in the basket of an assumption that the democratizing process will proceed on schedule. Karzai in Afghanistan and Allawi in Iraq have worked hard at developing complex nets of alliances with people and groups within and without their countries. We can only hope that we have proceeded in like manner. We should certainly reaffirm our commitments to the Kurds and the Turks, to moderate Shi'a and Sunni leaders, to leaders of the maze of old and new political parties, and to the many tribal leaders that play a cross-cutting role in the society. We must be prepared in extremis to realign our relationships, allowing others to take over responsibilities where we feel we cannot prevail without massive civilian casualties. The Falluja solution has not "worked" in Falluja as we would have liked. But it may still be a pattern that allows us to plan on exiting the country without a complete collapse of order within the next year. We should with our allies in the interim government think in terms of how we may maintain and service and secure "half a country" is we cannot reform it all. It is not in our interest, and not in that of Iraqis, for American and "coalition" forces to remain indefinitely in Iraq because the security situation in some areas is not as we would like.
In monitoring the situation, the next critical point will be whether and with what success the government can hold the elections for the National Convention and the National Assembly that its members are to select. The Convention elections were to have been held in July, but were postponed for security reasons and to increase nationwide support for the process. They are now to be held in August. If nothing happens in August to carry this process forward, it will be an serious setback, no matter how unimportant we might think the Assembly would be.
On August 6, the two most liberal Op-Ed columnists in the New York Times weighed in again on the side of pessimism on Iraqi outcomes. They both feel that the continued violence after the setting up of the interim government means that we are still sliding downhill toward a disaster. They are incensed that no one seems willing to admit to what is happening, or realizing the situation, able to come up with policies that might reverse the trends.
In our view, they are partly right and partly wrong. They are right in that there has been a continuation of violent attacks, the casualties continue to pile up, particularly of Iraqis of all stripes (police, insurgents, "civilians"). The collapse of the cease fire with the Mahdi Army is certainly a setback, as is the breakdown of the arrangements in Falluja (resulting in essentially an armed standoff between American forces on the outside of the city and insurgents of various varieties inside). Many other towns continue to be struck with suicide or roadside attacks even outside of the Sunni Triangle, especially in the Mosul area in the North. Kidnapping and holding for ransom under the threat of execution has become a common and to some extent effective tactic of at least some insurgent groups.
But the critics are wrong in not weighing the importance of positive changes in their accounting. There has been a steady increase in the participation and effectiveness of Iraqi police and other security units in the clashes that have occurred. The Americans are initiating less actions, staying mostly in their camps as a reaction force. (I see this as positive, they see this as negative.) There has been a revival of the Iraqi judicial and legal system, remarkable not in the pervasiveness of the revival but in the fact that judges and lawyers in some districts are able to go about their business with some confidence. The process leading toward an Iraqi government is continuing to unfold, even if unsteadily. The Interim Government is not as clearly independent of the Americans, or receiving as much support from the Iraqi people, as we would all like. But it is in business; it is developing an international presence; and leaders throughout the Middle East are coming to regard this government as the Government of Iraq. And, the point that we have repeatedly made in these pages, the insurgents seem deeply divided and without any clear picture of what they would like to see happen if the Americans and their "puppets" are defeated.
There is certainly enough in the arguments of the liberal editors to cause the United States to reexamine its policies, and to at least have contingency plans if things do fall apart again to the extent that they did in April. One can only hope that we have not put all our eggs in the basket of an assumption that the democratizing process will proceed on schedule. Karzai in Afghanistan and Allawi in Iraq have worked hard at developing complex nets of alliances with people and groups within and without their countries. We can only hope that we have proceeded in like manner. We should certainly reaffirm our commitments to the Kurds and the Turks, to moderate Shi'a and Sunni leaders, to leaders of the maze of old and new political parties, and to the many tribal leaders that play a cross-cutting role in the society. We must be prepared in extremis to realign our relationships, allowing others to take over responsibilities where we feel we cannot prevail without massive civilian casualties. The Falluja solution has not "worked" in Falluja as we would have liked. But it may still be a pattern that allows us to plan on exiting the country without a complete collapse of order within the next year. We should with our allies in the interim government think in terms of how we may maintain and service and secure "half a country" is we cannot reform it all. It is not in our interest, and not in that of Iraqis, for American and "coalition" forces to remain indefinitely in Iraq because the security situation in some areas is not as we would like.
In monitoring the situation, the next critical point will be whether and with what success the government can hold the elections for the National Convention and the National Assembly that its members are to select. The Convention elections were to have been held in July, but were postponed for security reasons and to increase nationwide support for the process. They are now to be held in August. If nothing happens in August to carry this process forward, it will be an serious setback, no matter how unimportant we might think the Assembly would be.
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