Tuesday, August 24, 2004
Global Domination or Global Leadership
I have just finished an excellent book by Brezezinski entitled The Choice: Global Domination or Global Leadership. His primary thesis is that to maintain its position and to smooth the transition to an inevitable future in which the United States will no longer be an unchallenged superpower, the country needs to begin now to establish stronger working relationships with like-minded states. In particular, and in the short term, it needs to work in partnership with an expanded European community. The way he puts it is that while the power of Europe is insufficiently organized for it to be a superpower on its own and an isolated American superpower will not be able to meet the challenges of the world (which are more than military), in combination they will form a truly unchallengeable and effective superpower. He goes on to envisage a future in which this community is gradually expanded to eventually include Russia, India, China, and Japan.
The book should be read, of course, as an extended critique of the unilateralism of the Bush administration based on the proposition that the United States is so strong it can do anything with or without allies. Brezezinski offers a number of reasons why this just is not so. In particular, he sees our Middle Eastern policy as unavoidably limited by the pro-Israel lobby. Only in tandem with Europe, and thus with both believable pro-Palestinian and pro-Israeli policies side by side can we work effectively with the Islamic world. If we accept the proposition that our policy should be Euro-American, it will be much less beholden to the pro-Israeli lobby. For unless the reality and the perception of our identification with Israel is changed, we can never have a satisfactory relation with the Islamic world. We cannot obtain our energy or anti-terrorist objectives in the long run unless our identification with the Israelis is moderated.
In passing, Brezezinski makes many other useful points. He distinguishes, for example, between preemption and prevention. The first is an action that must be taken now, because the crisis is upon us. The second is an action that has a considerably longer lead time, because the crisis is judged to be building but not yet upon us. Thus, we had no evidence that justified a preemptive strike against Iraq. We did have evidence that Iraq was a dangerous power that might try to develop WMD in the future. But a preventive war against Iraq could have been undertaken later after a great deal more diplomatic preparation of the ground. Another point is that globalization has naturally developed opposing forces against it. The only way to successfully confront these opponents is to develop more fully the moral dimension of globalization. We must give all of those involved more of a say in the process. We must "[tone] down [our] doctrinaire impulses, practicing what [we] preach, and [focus] more on the global good." Finally, he agrees with the policy of promoting democracy for all. But he cautions that "any just cause, in the hands of fanatics, will degenerate into its antithesis." If we try, for example, to fanatically force democracy down the throats of Islamic countries without regard to their history and culture we will produce the negation of democracy.
The book should be read, of course, as an extended critique of the unilateralism of the Bush administration based on the proposition that the United States is so strong it can do anything with or without allies. Brezezinski offers a number of reasons why this just is not so. In particular, he sees our Middle Eastern policy as unavoidably limited by the pro-Israel lobby. Only in tandem with Europe, and thus with both believable pro-Palestinian and pro-Israeli policies side by side can we work effectively with the Islamic world. If we accept the proposition that our policy should be Euro-American, it will be much less beholden to the pro-Israeli lobby. For unless the reality and the perception of our identification with Israel is changed, we can never have a satisfactory relation with the Islamic world. We cannot obtain our energy or anti-terrorist objectives in the long run unless our identification with the Israelis is moderated.
In passing, Brezezinski makes many other useful points. He distinguishes, for example, between preemption and prevention. The first is an action that must be taken now, because the crisis is upon us. The second is an action that has a considerably longer lead time, because the crisis is judged to be building but not yet upon us. Thus, we had no evidence that justified a preemptive strike against Iraq. We did have evidence that Iraq was a dangerous power that might try to develop WMD in the future. But a preventive war against Iraq could have been undertaken later after a great deal more diplomatic preparation of the ground. Another point is that globalization has naturally developed opposing forces against it. The only way to successfully confront these opponents is to develop more fully the moral dimension of globalization. We must give all of those involved more of a say in the process. We must "[tone] down [our] doctrinaire impulses, practicing what [we] preach, and [focus] more on the global good." Finally, he agrees with the policy of promoting democracy for all. But he cautions that "any just cause, in the hands of fanatics, will degenerate into its antithesis." If we try, for example, to fanatically force democracy down the throats of Islamic countries without regard to their history and culture we will produce the negation of democracy.
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