Iraq and Afghanistan

The United States, the Iraqi government, and the Mahdi Army of al-Sadr are locked in a major battle taking place in many communities, from the "Sadr City" section of Baghdad down through a number of major cities to Basra in the south. Some sketchy details include fighting between American, Iraqi, and Mahdi Army insurgents that has resulted in high casualties for the Mahdi Army. So far the Army seems to have unlimited men and materiel. In addition to fighting there have been marches in these cities against the Americans. They are protesting fighting so close to the Shrine of Imam Ali in Najaf as well as the killing of so many Iraqis. The key situation is the standoff in Najaf where the Mahdi Army is trapped and surrounded in the immediate area of the Shrine, as well as in a nearby cemetery. (Cole believes they have underground passages that make "trapped" indeterminate.) At last report, still another truce was being discussed.

With his extensive information base (background plus informants) Juan Cole emphasizes the degree to which this whole affair is turning more and more of the Shiite population against the government and the Americans. He reports that the vice-governor of Najaf, a government appointee, has resigned his post in protest against the attacks on Najaf by the government and their American allies. Others have resigned elsewhere, while top Shi'a leaders have been identifying more and more with Muqtada. Cole reports that while it may be true that many of the people of Najaf itself are disgusted with the Mahdi Army, in the wider Shiite community Muqtada al-Sadr is becoming a more and more respected leader. Soon he, or his followers if he is killed or imprisoned, will be in a position to maintain indefinitely an insurgency throughout the south, similar to that the Baath and Jihadists have been able to maintain within the Sunni triangle.

This is not an encouraging picture. The problem is that with his family background within the Shi'a movement, Muqtada has been able to appeal to that broad segment of the Shi'a community that had welcomed the bringing down of Saddam, but were more and more disaffected by the continuing American presence. The more conservative Shi'a leaders have understood that the process initiated by the Americans would work eventually in their favor. But the masses could not see this and could not wait for this "eventually". (Incidentally, this willingness of the masses to violently support irrational objectives does not bode too well for democracy, if and when it emerges.) We can only hope that Cole is wrong and that the government will come out of this crisis with enough credibility and effectiveness on the ground to continue to meet the goals of the democratization calendar.