Thursday, August 19, 2004
Exit Strategies
We return today to the dark subject of whether it is "Time to Quit" (Op-Ed, August 18). This has been addressed in several earlier posts (particularly April 7, 9, and 25). It is occasioned by an excellent Op-Ed under this heading by Edward Luttwak, a sometimes conservative expert on military affairs. After discussing the feeling of many commentators that we should just leave, he reviews the reasons most Americans still feel we should not, such as the resulting collapse of the government, invasion by neighbors, encouragement to Islamic extremists everywhere, and loss of America's global credibility.
Luttwak then proceeds to stand this argument on its head by arguing that it is precisely this list of dangers that makes it possible for United States to "disengage" at little cost. He feels that the Sadrists are able to get away with mayhem and our regional and international allies are able to carp on the sidelines, remain unhelpful, and pursue their own agendas precisely because they feel they can count on the United States "staying the course". If we were to cast doubt on this assumption, we would see a change in their willingness to help. He concludes from this analysis that we should begin making preparations for a departure now — and we have to mean it! If this doesn't change attitudes in the main players, then we should complete our withdrawal.
The basic argument is that other regional and international players have more to lose than we do in Iraq. We must use this advantage now while there is still time. If we do not, we may end up with worse choices, such as an evacuation under fire. Luttwak makes this rather extreme suggestion because he believes that if our reformation of the country continues to stumble, we will be throwing men and material goods away for nought. Sooner or later Americans will wake up to this fact and demand that we just leave, even if Saigon-style.
I would like to believe Luttwak. Unfortunately, like most strategists, he overestimates the role of logic and calculation in human affairs. As I have argued before, the Shiites should be supporting a process that is bound to lead to their domination of the country. Yet the violent young men in the street are moved more by nationalist hatred of the foreigner than such calculations, and it is increasingly unclear that their more moderate religious and political leaders can effectively stem this hatred. Too many Iraqis now see the Sadrists and other extremists as they would view combatants in a great drama between we and them. The more insurgents persist, the more they appear able to thumb their noses at the Americans, the more they become national heroes and the more are recruited to their cause. This may develop into an inexorable trend that Americans and the newly minted Iraqi government will find impossible to turn around.
Luttwak then proceeds to stand this argument on its head by arguing that it is precisely this list of dangers that makes it possible for United States to "disengage" at little cost. He feels that the Sadrists are able to get away with mayhem and our regional and international allies are able to carp on the sidelines, remain unhelpful, and pursue their own agendas precisely because they feel they can count on the United States "staying the course". If we were to cast doubt on this assumption, we would see a change in their willingness to help. He concludes from this analysis that we should begin making preparations for a departure now — and we have to mean it! If this doesn't change attitudes in the main players, then we should complete our withdrawal.
The basic argument is that other regional and international players have more to lose than we do in Iraq. We must use this advantage now while there is still time. If we do not, we may end up with worse choices, such as an evacuation under fire. Luttwak makes this rather extreme suggestion because he believes that if our reformation of the country continues to stumble, we will be throwing men and material goods away for nought. Sooner or later Americans will wake up to this fact and demand that we just leave, even if Saigon-style.
I would like to believe Luttwak. Unfortunately, like most strategists, he overestimates the role of logic and calculation in human affairs. As I have argued before, the Shiites should be supporting a process that is bound to lead to their domination of the country. Yet the violent young men in the street are moved more by nationalist hatred of the foreigner than such calculations, and it is increasingly unclear that their more moderate religious and political leaders can effectively stem this hatred. Too many Iraqis now see the Sadrists and other extremists as they would view combatants in a great drama between we and them. The more insurgents persist, the more they appear able to thumb their noses at the Americans, the more they become national heroes and the more are recruited to their cause. This may develop into an inexorable trend that Americans and the newly minted Iraqi government will find impossible to turn around.
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