Tuesday, August 10, 2004
Brookings Assessment of Progress in Iraq
Today's Times offers as an Op-Ed an assessment of the current situation in Iraq. It is compiled by two Brookings researchers. More complete information and the authors' sources are available as the Iraq Index. This Index is regularly updated. There seem to me some anomalies in this material, ones not completely removed in my mind by looking at the Index. For example, their estimate of Iraqi civilian casualties is far below what one normally sees. (They estimate about 2500; their notes point to other estimates more than twice that). I also wonder about the accuracy of polling data when it must be dangerous for even Iraqi pollsters to get into many areas. Nevertheless, Brookings is an earnest organization certainly without an Administration bias. So their statistics are probably as good as are available.
The authors point to definite improvement economically and in infrastructure. For example, the number of schools and hospitals in need of repair has steadily fallen. The availability of electricity and telephone service has increased. Perhaps most promising is the extent to which surveys show that Iraqis believe in and support their police and security forces. This is a much higher figure than that for support of the interim government, but that is not too bad either. Iraqis overwhelmingly expect their life to improve under the new government. The security forces are also growing rapidly since the debacle in April. The indicators for violence, including kidnapping, have not shown an improvement. Insurgent attacks on oil and gas facilities have rapidly escalated. (The al-Sadr threat to oil facilities in recent days has apparently shut down, at least temporarily, oil exports from the South.) This is at the same time that approval of foreign troops remaining in the country has fallen drastically, while approval of Muqtada al-Sadr has, at least up until recently, remained at a high level.
The picture is confusing, even more so if one looks at the back-up material. One can conclude that most Iraqis trust Iraqis, hate foreigners, hate violence, and like the promised democracy, and like Moqtada al-Sadr (apparently because of his anti-American diatribes). They are scared of the possibility of sectarian fighting. They want to run their own country, but do not seem too realistic as to how this might be achieved. They give little or no credit to the Americans, even for the good they have done. Very few want Saddam or the Baath back. When asked, most would say that the Americans should leave tomorrow, banking on a hope that violence sparked by their presence would decline and that Iraqi security forces would be able to handle remaining security problems. Many like the new leaders of the interim government; many do not. But they appear to prefer it to any alternative.
Today's Times offers as an Op-Ed an assessment of the current situation in Iraq. It is compiled by two Brookings researchers. More complete information and the authors' sources are available as the Iraq Index. This Index is regularly updated. There seem to me some anomalies in this material, ones not completely removed in my mind by looking at the Index. For example, their estimate of Iraqi civilian casualties is far below what one normally sees. (They estimate about 2500; their notes point to other estimates more than twice that). I also wonder about the accuracy of polling data when it must be dangerous for even Iraqi pollsters to get into many areas. Nevertheless, Brookings is an earnest organization certainly without an Administration bias. So their statistics are probably as good as are available.
The authors point to definite improvement economically and in infrastructure. For example, the number of schools and hospitals in need of repair has steadily fallen. The availability of electricity and telephone service has increased. Perhaps most promising is the extent to which surveys show that Iraqis believe in and support their police and security forces. This is a much higher figure than that for support of the interim government, but that is not too bad either. Iraqis overwhelmingly expect their life to improve under the new government. The security forces are also growing rapidly since the debacle in April. The indicators for violence, including kidnapping, have not shown an improvement. Insurgent attacks on oil and gas facilities have rapidly escalated. (The al-Sadr threat to oil facilities in recent days has apparently shut down, at least temporarily, oil exports from the South.) This is at the same time that approval of foreign troops remaining in the country has fallen drastically, while approval of Muqtada al-Sadr has, at least up until recently, remained at a high level.
The picture is confusing, even more so if one looks at the back-up material. One can conclude that most Iraqis trust Iraqis, hate foreigners, hate violence, and like the promised democracy, and like Moqtada al-Sadr (apparently because of his anti-American diatribes). They are scared of the possibility of sectarian fighting. They want to run their own country, but do not seem too realistic as to how this might be achieved. They give little or no credit to the Americans, even for the good they have done. Very few want Saddam or the Baath back. When asked, most would say that the Americans should leave tomorrow, banking on a hope that violence sparked by their presence would decline and that Iraqi security forces would be able to handle remaining security problems. Many like the new leaders of the interim government; many do not. But they appear to prefer it to any alternative.
Comments:
Post a Comment
Links to this post:
