Iraq and Afghanistan

In my recent discussion of the situation of Ismail Khan in Herat, I spoke too soon. It seems that the recent attacks on Ismail Khan's in Herat have come from Amanullah Khan a Pashtun leader who controls an area nearby. Although Kabul sent in national and American forces to assist Ismail Khan, Amanullah's attacks may have actually been encouraged by a government minister as the beginning of a campaign to get rid of Ismail. Kabul is said to be fearing a general breakdown of order in the area because Ismail Khan's control is slipping. Apparently his problem is also that he is too anti-American. Both Khans may end up as permanent guests in Kabul and be rewarded with positions in the new government when it is formed (an old Afghan way of dealing with troublesome Khans). I do not see why the Kabul government would prefer a Pashtun tribal leader over a Tajik leader like Ismail. After all, the base of the Taliban has always been the Pashtuns.

Meanwhile, back in Kabul as the elections near, explosions and assassinations have become more common. The Taliban vows to block the elections, and suggests that they have slipped many supporters into Kabul to increase the violence. It would seem to me that the national army has enough to do in Kabul and in engaging the Taliban without worrying about order in the West. All this danger is, of course, another cost of going into Iraq before we had really brought the country under the control of Kabul (or at least established a peaceful order of some kind) and effectively reduced the sway of the Taliban (and al-Qaida) everywhere. Remember that after the first defeat of the Taliban, Karzai pleaded with the Americans and the West to bring in more troops to stabilize the situation. We should have accepted this request with alacrity. But we did not. Now we do not have the forces to make a difference.