Thursday, July 15, 2004
Security in Iraq
The violence in Iraq continues. But it also continues to take on a more promising coloration.
First, a couple of days ago the Iraqi policemen rounded up nearly 500 persons suspected of criminal rather than insurgent/terrorist activity. Apparently in the streets of Baghdad, the fear of the average person is at least as much a fear of violent crime as it is of being caught in the crossfire of the internal warfare. This kind of crackdown is likely to be widely applauded on the streets. It is also good for morale, since while policemen were killed in the effort, it remains quite a bit easier to move against street criminals than against the better armed and motivated insurgents. Unlike insurgents in some areas, the criminals are unlikely to be able to rely on a friendly a population base.
It should be noted in passing that what is judged to be common criminality is often a spin-off of insurgent violence. For one thing, insurgent success often clears the streets of the police force that criminals would otherwise confront. In addition, in many insurgencies idealistic violence frequently degenerates into self-interested violence. Initial reasons for the change can come from the need for money and arms by any insurgent group as well as the natural rivalries of subgroup leaders (who become gang leaders) within any violent movement. To a lesser degree, this transformation also happens within the armed forces and police on the "government side". The end result in Colombia, for example, has been a transformation of the "insurgency" problem into that of controlling a variety of large gangs fighting one another largely for economic gain (fueled here by drugs), as well as a need for a widespread purging of the security forces.
Second, the suicide attack yesterday in the middle of Baghdad was directed entirely at Iraqis. Similar in nature was the ambush and killing of the new Governor of Ninevah Province (Mosul) in the North. The Governor was apparently a well-liked individual who had striven to bring together the many ethnic groups in his area. Both of these events will maintain a high level of fear. But neither is likely to be popular with more than a small segment of Iraqi public opinion.
Americans continue to be killed. They continue to become involved in fire fights, such as one yesterday in which Marines turned an attack on their position into the killing of 20 insurgents. But the overall impression is that battle casualties continue to go down, Americans are initiating fewer contacts, and, as important, fewer Iraqi civilians are being killed by American soldiers or by American support planes attacking insurgent positions. Perhaps our forces should be doing more. There is much that could be done. The Governor was ambushed on a stretch of road well known for previous attacks. Yet if we can preserve our lower, less inflammatory profile, and the Iraqis can actually take over where we left off, our prospects are promising.
The violence in Iraq continues. But it also continues to take on a more promising coloration.
First, a couple of days ago the Iraqi policemen rounded up nearly 500 persons suspected of criminal rather than insurgent/terrorist activity. Apparently in the streets of Baghdad, the fear of the average person is at least as much a fear of violent crime as it is of being caught in the crossfire of the internal warfare. This kind of crackdown is likely to be widely applauded on the streets. It is also good for morale, since while policemen were killed in the effort, it remains quite a bit easier to move against street criminals than against the better armed and motivated insurgents. Unlike insurgents in some areas, the criminals are unlikely to be able to rely on a friendly a population base.
It should be noted in passing that what is judged to be common criminality is often a spin-off of insurgent violence. For one thing, insurgent success often clears the streets of the police force that criminals would otherwise confront. In addition, in many insurgencies idealistic violence frequently degenerates into self-interested violence. Initial reasons for the change can come from the need for money and arms by any insurgent group as well as the natural rivalries of subgroup leaders (who become gang leaders) within any violent movement. To a lesser degree, this transformation also happens within the armed forces and police on the "government side". The end result in Colombia, for example, has been a transformation of the "insurgency" problem into that of controlling a variety of large gangs fighting one another largely for economic gain (fueled here by drugs), as well as a need for a widespread purging of the security forces.
Second, the suicide attack yesterday in the middle of Baghdad was directed entirely at Iraqis. Similar in nature was the ambush and killing of the new Governor of Ninevah Province (Mosul) in the North. The Governor was apparently a well-liked individual who had striven to bring together the many ethnic groups in his area. Both of these events will maintain a high level of fear. But neither is likely to be popular with more than a small segment of Iraqi public opinion.
Americans continue to be killed. They continue to become involved in fire fights, such as one yesterday in which Marines turned an attack on their position into the killing of 20 insurgents. But the overall impression is that battle casualties continue to go down, Americans are initiating fewer contacts, and, as important, fewer Iraqi civilians are being killed by American soldiers or by American support planes attacking insurgent positions. Perhaps our forces should be doing more. There is much that could be done. The Governor was ambushed on a stretch of road well known for previous attacks. Yet if we can preserve our lower, less inflammatory profile, and the Iraqis can actually take over where we left off, our prospects are promising.
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