Friday, July 02, 2004
Saddam Hussein and New Directions
Knowledgeable commentators in today's New York Times, and coincidentally on this morning's Diane Riehm show, continue to speak a line of doom and gloom. Since they see little legitimacy for the interim government, they see America's forces sunk in a quagmire from which it will take years to emerge. They may be right. But I continue to see a silver lining that they are missing. In spite of an article in today's NYT claiming the contrary, the last few days have seen less violence in the country. What violence there is continues to be concentrated in the Sunni Triangle.
It seems to me we understand the mortification of Saddam before the court from the point of view of the Iraqi population as a whole.
Montefiore (Op-Ed, July 2) makes some thoughtful comparisons between Saddam Hussein and Stalin. Like Stalin, after the fact many Iraqis will treat Saddam as a national hero. However, the ways in which the comparison fails are also significant, particularly when related to the effect of Saddam's trial on the Iraqi people. Although a Georgian, Stalin became identified with the Russian people as a whole, and he did not single out any important ethnic segment of this population for oppression. Saddam, however, is reviled as their oppressor by the vast majority of the Shiites (60-65%) and Kurds (over 15-20%). He has had, and may still have, the loyalty of a majority of the Sunni Arab population (15%). This suggests that the current trial, with its attempt to further discredit Saddam, promises to help most of the country come together in support of the new government to an extent that was not possible in Russia. No matter how effective Saddam is before the court, and this effectiveness admittedly could be a problem, he is unlikely to sway more than people from the small group that felt empowered by his rule.
Thus, while we are hearing some pro-Saddam comments in interviews in Baghdad, within the Sunni community, I expect few we will hear few from outside this area. And we must remember that an important segment of the Sunni Arab community, particularly its intellectuals, also suffered under Saddam.
If anything like this interpretation is correct, then we should follow Brezezinski's suggestion and set an early time table for the departure of at least the bulk of our forces. In the interim, our forces should be concentrated in support of Iraqi security forces in the Sunni Triangle and positioned to guard major infrastructure facilities. We should then work out a much more limited presence in the rest of the country, so that in appearance and reality, these areas, at least, will no longer be "occupied" by the foreigner. On this basis, a time table should be developed to reduce and remove the American presence.
Knowledgeable commentators in today's New York Times, and coincidentally on this morning's Diane Riehm show, continue to speak a line of doom and gloom. Since they see little legitimacy for the interim government, they see America's forces sunk in a quagmire from which it will take years to emerge. They may be right. But I continue to see a silver lining that they are missing. In spite of an article in today's NYT claiming the contrary, the last few days have seen less violence in the country. What violence there is continues to be concentrated in the Sunni Triangle.
It seems to me we understand the mortification of Saddam before the court from the point of view of the Iraqi population as a whole.
Montefiore (Op-Ed, July 2) makes some thoughtful comparisons between Saddam Hussein and Stalin. Like Stalin, after the fact many Iraqis will treat Saddam as a national hero. However, the ways in which the comparison fails are also significant, particularly when related to the effect of Saddam's trial on the Iraqi people. Although a Georgian, Stalin became identified with the Russian people as a whole, and he did not single out any important ethnic segment of this population for oppression. Saddam, however, is reviled as their oppressor by the vast majority of the Shiites (60-65%) and Kurds (over 15-20%). He has had, and may still have, the loyalty of a majority of the Sunni Arab population (15%). This suggests that the current trial, with its attempt to further discredit Saddam, promises to help most of the country come together in support of the new government to an extent that was not possible in Russia. No matter how effective Saddam is before the court, and this effectiveness admittedly could be a problem, he is unlikely to sway more than people from the small group that felt empowered by his rule.
Thus, while we are hearing some pro-Saddam comments in interviews in Baghdad, within the Sunni community, I expect few we will hear few from outside this area. And we must remember that an important segment of the Sunni Arab community, particularly its intellectuals, also suffered under Saddam.
If anything like this interpretation is correct, then we should follow Brezezinski's suggestion and set an early time table for the departure of at least the bulk of our forces. In the interim, our forces should be concentrated in support of Iraqi security forces in the Sunni Triangle and positioned to guard major infrastructure facilities. We should then work out a much more limited presence in the rest of the country, so that in appearance and reality, these areas, at least, will no longer be "occupied" by the foreigner. On this basis, a time table should be developed to reduce and remove the American presence.
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