Monday, July 19, 2004
Retooling Intelligence
There continues to be discussion in Washington of proposals to reorganize the intelligence services. The most talked about suggestion is that there should be appointed a new "czar" of intelligence with "cabinet rank". This evidently does not mean that individuals in this position would serve at the pleasure of particular administrations, since one of the proposals is that an appointee should have a guaranteed term of ten years. Yet essentially the new person would not be free of political pressure (remember Tenet was a Clinton appointee who was absorbed into the Bush administrative structure with what may have been disastrous results.)
Today, the Times reported the "amazing fact" that a relatively small intelligence agency in the State Department, the Bureau of Intelligence and Research, with "only" 165 analysts (compared to over 3000 in the CIA) seemed to have understood intelligence issues during the critical period leading up to 9/11 and the Iraq War better than the larger agencies. Its staff members tend to remain in I&R for relatively long periods, and to specialize in particular fields for longer than their counterparts. Even though its staff is not privy to all the information the CIA or DIA might have, its academically recruited experts appear to do a much better job of analyzing available data.
This "amazing fact" brings me back to my favorite idea of fully funding several intelligence agencies such as I&R and then maintaining them indefinitely in a private-public sector. One might be a contract agency attached to the RAND Corporation. Another might be a special part of the GAO, and therefore funded by Congress. Another might be a purely private agency funded by extremely wealthy individuals in a consortium perhaps with leading universities. The heart of the concept is that these sources of analysis should be separate from any government or administration pressure and that they should be able to recruit as full-time employees and consultants some of the best intellects and most knowledgeable persons in the country. Some staff members or consultants would want to have clearances; others would prefer not. In any event, these are the types of people that should be regularly going over threat assessments and the quality of our responses. They should report in a variety of ways. But over time I would suspect that no administration would be able to ignore what they have to say.
There continues to be discussion in Washington of proposals to reorganize the intelligence services. The most talked about suggestion is that there should be appointed a new "czar" of intelligence with "cabinet rank". This evidently does not mean that individuals in this position would serve at the pleasure of particular administrations, since one of the proposals is that an appointee should have a guaranteed term of ten years. Yet essentially the new person would not be free of political pressure (remember Tenet was a Clinton appointee who was absorbed into the Bush administrative structure with what may have been disastrous results.)
Today, the Times reported the "amazing fact" that a relatively small intelligence agency in the State Department, the Bureau of Intelligence and Research, with "only" 165 analysts (compared to over 3000 in the CIA) seemed to have understood intelligence issues during the critical period leading up to 9/11 and the Iraq War better than the larger agencies. Its staff members tend to remain in I&R for relatively long periods, and to specialize in particular fields for longer than their counterparts. Even though its staff is not privy to all the information the CIA or DIA might have, its academically recruited experts appear to do a much better job of analyzing available data.
This "amazing fact" brings me back to my favorite idea of fully funding several intelligence agencies such as I&R and then maintaining them indefinitely in a private-public sector. One might be a contract agency attached to the RAND Corporation. Another might be a special part of the GAO, and therefore funded by Congress. Another might be a purely private agency funded by extremely wealthy individuals in a consortium perhaps with leading universities. The heart of the concept is that these sources of analysis should be separate from any government or administration pressure and that they should be able to recruit as full-time employees and consultants some of the best intellects and most knowledgeable persons in the country. Some staff members or consultants would want to have clearances; others would prefer not. In any event, these are the types of people that should be regularly going over threat assessments and the quality of our responses. They should report in a variety of ways. But over time I would suspect that no administration would be able to ignore what they have to say.
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