Thursday, July 29, 2004
Iraqi Response to Suicide Bombings
Yesterday, the worst suicide bomber attack since the interim government was established took place in Baquba. Marked by violence in the recent past, Baquba is a town divided between Sunni and Shi'a. Many of those killed (all were Iraqis) were lining up for jobs in the police force. A policeman had evidently gone down the line just before the blast warning the people in line that they were setting up a target. It is quite possible that this was a Sunni versus Shi'a event, for the Shi'a may be more likely here to want to join the police. However, it was not so described. The Shi'a seem more inclined to the new government; the Sunni more fearful of eventual loss of status. There were apparently many Iraqis on the street who said this violence was senseless (but we do not know their affiliation). My guess would be that the suicide bomber was a Sunni, either a foreigner or one connected to the foreigners.
The bulk of the Sunni Arab population must be seriously conflicted. They hate the occupation and the loss of status that goes with Saddam's downfall. But they also want the killing to end. As long as it goes on they are in personal danger. If the new government cannot control the killing, they would be willing to consider an alternative that would stop it. They can imagine a Sunni dominated authoritarian regime emerging that might be in their long-term interest. But they know such a government can only emerge after the new government fails and the Americans leave (and how likely is the latter as long as security is not established?) They would accept nondemocracy, but would it be secular nationalist or jihadist? Most Sunni Arabs have gotten used to a secular life under Saddam and are probably loathe to give this up. The foreigner insurgents are Muslims, but they are still foreigners who do not seem to care how many Iraqis they kill.
The Sunni Kurds are conflicted in other ways. Many have gotten used to being a part of Iraq. For them, Baghdad is their capital too. The Kurds back in the enclaves, meanwhile, have gotten used to a relatively free and secular way of life outside of the control of Baghdad. Most of the violence in the enclaves is homegrown. This is not too bothersome, for they are used to that. What they have to decide is how important Iraq is for them as a community, and as individuals separately. They know they do not want to be part of a Sunni Arab state, nationalist or not. Whether they can accept being a minor part of a Shi'a dominated, more or less democratic, state is less clear. They know that whatever initial guarantees they may obtain, once their forces are dispersed in a new dispensation, these guarantees can be torn up.
I suspect that for most Shi'a, particularly outside the Sunni Triangle, issues are clearer. They know they have a chance to rule for the first time in their history if progress toward democracy continues. Although they may hate the Americans and may think the new regime is only a puppet regime, they know that the Americans do hold the Sunnis somewhat in check. For now Americans are the lesser evil. They hate most of these Arab foreigners with their suicide bombers because most of them are anti-Shi'a as well as anti-American. Some Shi'a want to recreate a secular state under democracy. But the Shi'a did not benefit from the Saddam state as much as the Sunni Arabs. So most Shi'a are probably not too sure just what the religious dimensions of the new state should be. The most aggressive leaders want a large religious component, but the most popular older generation of Shi'a leaders do not believe that the Ulema should take a direct part in running the state.
Yesterday, the worst suicide bomber attack since the interim government was established took place in Baquba. Marked by violence in the recent past, Baquba is a town divided between Sunni and Shi'a. Many of those killed (all were Iraqis) were lining up for jobs in the police force. A policeman had evidently gone down the line just before the blast warning the people in line that they were setting up a target. It is quite possible that this was a Sunni versus Shi'a event, for the Shi'a may be more likely here to want to join the police. However, it was not so described. The Shi'a seem more inclined to the new government; the Sunni more fearful of eventual loss of status. There were apparently many Iraqis on the street who said this violence was senseless (but we do not know their affiliation). My guess would be that the suicide bomber was a Sunni, either a foreigner or one connected to the foreigners.
The bulk of the Sunni Arab population must be seriously conflicted. They hate the occupation and the loss of status that goes with Saddam's downfall. But they also want the killing to end. As long as it goes on they are in personal danger. If the new government cannot control the killing, they would be willing to consider an alternative that would stop it. They can imagine a Sunni dominated authoritarian regime emerging that might be in their long-term interest. But they know such a government can only emerge after the new government fails and the Americans leave (and how likely is the latter as long as security is not established?) They would accept nondemocracy, but would it be secular nationalist or jihadist? Most Sunni Arabs have gotten used to a secular life under Saddam and are probably loathe to give this up. The foreigner insurgents are Muslims, but they are still foreigners who do not seem to care how many Iraqis they kill.
The Sunni Kurds are conflicted in other ways. Many have gotten used to being a part of Iraq. For them, Baghdad is their capital too. The Kurds back in the enclaves, meanwhile, have gotten used to a relatively free and secular way of life outside of the control of Baghdad. Most of the violence in the enclaves is homegrown. This is not too bothersome, for they are used to that. What they have to decide is how important Iraq is for them as a community, and as individuals separately. They know they do not want to be part of a Sunni Arab state, nationalist or not. Whether they can accept being a minor part of a Shi'a dominated, more or less democratic, state is less clear. They know that whatever initial guarantees they may obtain, once their forces are dispersed in a new dispensation, these guarantees can be torn up.
I suspect that for most Shi'a, particularly outside the Sunni Triangle, issues are clearer. They know they have a chance to rule for the first time in their history if progress toward democracy continues. Although they may hate the Americans and may think the new regime is only a puppet regime, they know that the Americans do hold the Sunnis somewhat in check. For now Americans are the lesser evil. They hate most of these Arab foreigners with their suicide bombers because most of them are anti-Shi'a as well as anti-American. Some Shi'a want to recreate a secular state under democracy. But the Shi'a did not benefit from the Saddam state as much as the Sunni Arabs. So most Shi'a are probably not too sure just what the religious dimensions of the new state should be. The most aggressive leaders want a large religious component, but the most popular older generation of Shi'a leaders do not believe that the Ulema should take a direct part in running the state.
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