Friday, July 02, 2004
Iran and Iraq: Analysis
In their latest "Strategic Comments", the International Institute for Strategic Studies analyzes the interests and activities of Iran in Iraq. They naturally have had and have a variety of different interests. One simple one is to thwart the development of American power in the area as long as their relations with the United States remain at a nadir. They are said to have thousands of agents in Iraq, yet one wonders because only a handful of Iranians have been arrested and imprisoned. (Another analysis says that the "foreigners" in the insurgency are coming over the Syrian border not the Iranian. ) Iran has been holding (sheltering?) a few al-Qaida agents primarily as an irritant to the United States (according to the analysis). Incidentally, one relationship the analysis does not consider adequately is that to the Kurds. Yes, Tehran formerly supported Talabani's Kurds versus Barzani's. But the leaders in Tehran are probably as nationalistic as ever when it comes to Kurdish independence. One can only assume that they would fear and oppose an essentially independent Kurdistan, just as the Turks do.
But what I find of most interest in the analysis of the relationship of the top clerics in Tehran to Iraqi Shiism. Their ambition after Khomeini has been to lead the Shiite world, replacing effectively the leadership formerly headquartered in Najaf and Karbala. Thus, they fear a loss of religious leadership if Iraq should emerge as a stable society. Aside from the question of pride of leadership, the analysis says that the doctrine of Velayat-i-Faqih, developed by Khomeini and incorporated into the Iranian Constitution, is not accepted by any leading Shiite cleric in Iraq. This doctrine, that religious leaders should directly rule the state, is anathema to Ayatollah Sistani in Iraq. Should Sistani and those around him come to be seen again as the intellectual leaders of Shiism, this would cast doubt on the legitimacy of the Iranian state. Tehran is also concerned about the nationalism of some Iraqi clerics, such as Moqtada al-Sadr. These clerics have voiced an extreme anti-Americanism, but clothed it as more nationalist than Shiite. I would conclude that Tehran has little reason to believe that Iraq under Shiite majority rule would be an Iraq they could live with.
In their latest "Strategic Comments", the International Institute for Strategic Studies analyzes the interests and activities of Iran in Iraq. They naturally have had and have a variety of different interests. One simple one is to thwart the development of American power in the area as long as their relations with the United States remain at a nadir. They are said to have thousands of agents in Iraq, yet one wonders because only a handful of Iranians have been arrested and imprisoned. (Another analysis says that the "foreigners" in the insurgency are coming over the Syrian border not the Iranian. ) Iran has been holding (sheltering?) a few al-Qaida agents primarily as an irritant to the United States (according to the analysis). Incidentally, one relationship the analysis does not consider adequately is that to the Kurds. Yes, Tehran formerly supported Talabani's Kurds versus Barzani's. But the leaders in Tehran are probably as nationalistic as ever when it comes to Kurdish independence. One can only assume that they would fear and oppose an essentially independent Kurdistan, just as the Turks do.
But what I find of most interest in the analysis of the relationship of the top clerics in Tehran to Iraqi Shiism. Their ambition after Khomeini has been to lead the Shiite world, replacing effectively the leadership formerly headquartered in Najaf and Karbala. Thus, they fear a loss of religious leadership if Iraq should emerge as a stable society. Aside from the question of pride of leadership, the analysis says that the doctrine of Velayat-i-Faqih, developed by Khomeini and incorporated into the Iranian Constitution, is not accepted by any leading Shiite cleric in Iraq. This doctrine, that religious leaders should directly rule the state, is anathema to Ayatollah Sistani in Iraq. Should Sistani and those around him come to be seen again as the intellectual leaders of Shiism, this would cast doubt on the legitimacy of the Iranian state. Tehran is also concerned about the nationalism of some Iraqi clerics, such as Moqtada al-Sadr. These clerics have voiced an extreme anti-Americanism, but clothed it as more nationalist than Shiite. I would conclude that Tehran has little reason to believe that Iraq under Shiite majority rule would be an Iraq they could live with.
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