Monday, June 28, 2004
The Transfer of Power I
The Iraqis have formally taken over. Paul Bremer has left the country and Ambassador Negroponte had taken over for the American side. Apparently Bremer and the Prime Minister had decided several days ago that in order to avoid violence on Wednesday, they would transfer power early. So they set up a ceremony, everyone was sworn in, and the new government is under way. It was a smart move. It avoids giving the opposition a chance to bring off a final spectacular just before and during the transfer ceremonies. Unfortunately, it may also contribute to perceptions in Iraq and abroad that the transfer is all a facade or that we are on the run from the insurgents. Many commentators, including Professor Cole, are quite dismissive of the new government and its prospects. They claim that nearly everyone is against the new regime. American military polls, for what they are worth, show the opposite. Analytically, at least, there are several reasons to be a little positive.
(1) In the last few days violence had been directed almost entirely at Iraqis and almost entirely in the Sunni Triangle or nearby. (This is not too reassuring since Baghdad is in this area.) Some of it is obviously well organized, but much of it appears to be random anti-foreign or anti-collaborator violence. Most of the country appears relatively calm.
(2) The recent insurgent emphasis on kidnapping and beheading is characteristic of a terrorist campaign rather than an insurgency or guerrilla war. It is more of the Bin Ladin type of thing, rather than a campaign to take over a country and rule it. Moreover some of the efforts have resulted in indiscriminate killing that is bound to turn off many Iraqis.
(3) The new government and its Coalition supporters are now dedicated to the idea that they can succeed only by combining political and military action. Allawi has reaffirmed keeping to the election date and he is talking of amnesty, allowing electoral participation, for some of those who have been in the opposition, particularly for the "Mahdi Army" of the Sadrists.
(4) Professor Cole reports that the new government is trying to reconstitute both Saddam's army and his secret police. He laments the latter. Yet the Americans and the interim government are in a bind. With the personnel they now have our side simply does not have the intelligence to fight this enemy. I imagine the American approach has broken down even further after the prison scandals. What we need now is an army and an intelligence group no longer identified with us that can fight back. Since nearly every member of the interim government suffered from Saddam's rule, I doubt if they are simply going to reestablish its institutions and reconstitute the horrors of the past. We must remember that Putin was a high ranking officer in the KGB before he became head of Russia. That fact helps him rule a difficult country, but it has not meant that Stalinism or anything approaching it has been reestablished in Russia. So let us monitor without jumping to conclusions what Allawi and al-Yawar are doing, hoping to help them succeed without losing their direction. (It is what we as citizens have to do in the U.S. with the Patriot Act and similar measures pushed through ostensibly to respond to our fears of terrorism.)
(5) NATO has just agreed to send aid, particularly in the form of trainers. At least, this gives a more international flavor to the effort than we have had before.
In the meantime, the Iraqi security forces have got to show that they will do more than stand by as the country goes up in flames. It will be wonderful when they are well trained and so on. But the problem is now. What is required now is an area by area agreement as to who does what. Where Iraqi forces are weak and demoralized, penetrated by insurgents etc., and there are many places in the Triangle where this is true, we must work out something better than the Falluja solution while at the same time reducing the killing and destruction incident to American interventions. Where more authority and responsibility can be given to the Iraqi forces on the ground, we should back off, while preparing to respond quickly when needed. It is my impression that working this out is what the Iraqis and Americans are in the process of doing now. One can hope.
The Iraqis have formally taken over. Paul Bremer has left the country and Ambassador Negroponte had taken over for the American side. Apparently Bremer and the Prime Minister had decided several days ago that in order to avoid violence on Wednesday, they would transfer power early. So they set up a ceremony, everyone was sworn in, and the new government is under way. It was a smart move. It avoids giving the opposition a chance to bring off a final spectacular just before and during the transfer ceremonies. Unfortunately, it may also contribute to perceptions in Iraq and abroad that the transfer is all a facade or that we are on the run from the insurgents. Many commentators, including Professor Cole, are quite dismissive of the new government and its prospects. They claim that nearly everyone is against the new regime. American military polls, for what they are worth, show the opposite. Analytically, at least, there are several reasons to be a little positive.
(1) In the last few days violence had been directed almost entirely at Iraqis and almost entirely in the Sunni Triangle or nearby. (This is not too reassuring since Baghdad is in this area.) Some of it is obviously well organized, but much of it appears to be random anti-foreign or anti-collaborator violence. Most of the country appears relatively calm.
(2) The recent insurgent emphasis on kidnapping and beheading is characteristic of a terrorist campaign rather than an insurgency or guerrilla war. It is more of the Bin Ladin type of thing, rather than a campaign to take over a country and rule it. Moreover some of the efforts have resulted in indiscriminate killing that is bound to turn off many Iraqis.
(3) The new government and its Coalition supporters are now dedicated to the idea that they can succeed only by combining political and military action. Allawi has reaffirmed keeping to the election date and he is talking of amnesty, allowing electoral participation, for some of those who have been in the opposition, particularly for the "Mahdi Army" of the Sadrists.
(4) Professor Cole reports that the new government is trying to reconstitute both Saddam's army and his secret police. He laments the latter. Yet the Americans and the interim government are in a bind. With the personnel they now have our side simply does not have the intelligence to fight this enemy. I imagine the American approach has broken down even further after the prison scandals. What we need now is an army and an intelligence group no longer identified with us that can fight back. Since nearly every member of the interim government suffered from Saddam's rule, I doubt if they are simply going to reestablish its institutions and reconstitute the horrors of the past. We must remember that Putin was a high ranking officer in the KGB before he became head of Russia. That fact helps him rule a difficult country, but it has not meant that Stalinism or anything approaching it has been reestablished in Russia. So let us monitor without jumping to conclusions what Allawi and al-Yawar are doing, hoping to help them succeed without losing their direction. (It is what we as citizens have to do in the U.S. with the Patriot Act and similar measures pushed through ostensibly to respond to our fears of terrorism.)
(5) NATO has just agreed to send aid, particularly in the form of trainers. At least, this gives a more international flavor to the effort than we have had before.
In the meantime, the Iraqi security forces have got to show that they will do more than stand by as the country goes up in flames. It will be wonderful when they are well trained and so on. But the problem is now. What is required now is an area by area agreement as to who does what. Where Iraqi forces are weak and demoralized, penetrated by insurgents etc., and there are many places in the Triangle where this is true, we must work out something better than the Falluja solution while at the same time reducing the killing and destruction incident to American interventions. Where more authority and responsibility can be given to the Iraqi forces on the ground, we should back off, while preparing to respond quickly when needed. It is my impression that working this out is what the Iraqis and Americans are in the process of doing now. One can hope.
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