Saturday, June 26, 2004
Rationing and Targeting Our International Forces
Even before 9/11, I had concluded that there were four states in the world that the United States should move urgently to transform with the help of the world community: North Korea, Afghanistan, Iraq, and Sudan. There were many other failed states in the world, such as Haiti or Somalia, but these four states stood out in terms of egregious human rights violations, denials of freedom on a scale far beyond that found in their neighbors. I was not in this regard concerned with dangers such as WMD, but certainly North Korea and Iraq were worthy of concern on this score. Nor was I concerned with al-Qaida in Afghanistan — the oppression of its women was reason enough — the shelling of the Buddhas was the last straw.
Now, and for other reasons, we have acted against the leadership in two of the four. Neither has been, nor is likely to be, transformed quickly into a paradise. But Afghanistanis and Iraqis lead lives today that offer possibilities that they did not have before. This will be the case in Iraq even if the Americans are "thrown out" in the near future. We have, however, not yet acted effectively to alter the situation in Sudan or North Korea. Each country presents its own special problems, and to resolve these we will eventually get the assistance of the international community.
The United States has been remarkably unconcerned about North Korea. Even if it had not had a nuclear buildup, the callous and thoughtless way its regime has crushed its people and allowed hundreds of thousands to starve for ideological reasons would have been reason enough to act long before now. Now, the continual off again, on again nuclear threat, apparently engineered as part of a giant blackmail scheme, gives an additional strong reason to act with little delay. Yet two of the other main players, China and Russia, still seem unwilling to take a strong stance. More important, our ally, South Korea, the country whose entire success, indeed existence, since World War has depended on continuous American protection is carrying on as though the North were a "normal state", if only a little poorer than most. If Americans cannot imagine why Iraqis think of us as an "occupying force", they should consider South Korea where a large and vocal segment of the population also believes that we are an occupying force. They seem convinced, against all evidence, that if the Americans left, all would be peace and quiet on the Peninsula, with the North adopting the good life of the South at its own pace.
It is tempting, of course, to consider North Korea something like the Soviet Union just before Perestroika. Unfortunately, North Korea is immeasurably more repressive. Many Russians knew that they were oppressed by communism and knew that the rest of the world was leaving them behind because of their system. There is little reason to believe that such beliefs are widespread in the North — although given the right conditions there could be an explosion that would make the North another version of East Germany with the wall torn down. I raise these possibilities not because I believe them, but to suggest that Southerners who think this way should not be totally dismissed. Meanwhile, the United States has to deal with an intolerable North and a politically hard to deal with South while continuing to bear the burden of preventing major nuclear destruction in the Far East (we cannot know it is all a bluff).
What has happened in the Sudan is that the long civil war between the North and South, of Muslims in the North against Christians and Animists in the South has claimed countless lives directly and indirectly in the last thirty years. Starting in the 1980s, this conflict spilled over into Darfur in the West where there had long been unrelated struggles among tribal and ethnic groups. Even though all groups were Muslim, some considered themselves "Arab" while others were seen as "black", some were settled farmers, and some were nomads. The government at first started arming groups to resist the Southern forces that had established a base. Later, after this base disintegrated, the Westerners started a revolutionary movement of their own, particularly among the non-Arabs. (Darfur was only incorporated in Sudan in 1917.) The government sent a relief force, but was badly beaten. In response, the government then began arming the nomadic groups, particularly the "janjaweed", loosely organized brigands. These appear to have been asked to solve the regional problem by driving out or killing the members of the principal settled tribes. (All agree that with environmental degradation, there is simply not enough land for the various groups, so in a brutal way this may have made sense in Khartoum.) The result has been a humanitarian tragedy that the Sudanese government instigated and has been unwilling or unable to stop. International relief organizations have found it extremely difficult to operate in the area, as well as in neighboring Chad where many refugees have fled. The reason has been the very difficult conditions, especially transportation, and the reluctance of the Sudanese government (and perhaps to some degree the Chadian) to allow them free access. At first, the United States and other major states were unwilling to press too hard on this issue because after many years of effort they thought they had reached a working agreement among the leaders of the North and South to settle their larger war. However, the world is at last turning its attention to Darfur. We do not know yet with what result.
The tragedy in Sudan illustrates why the United States, no matter how powerful, must not waste its resources on ill-timed and poorly planned adventures. We should, for example, have waited a year before invading Iraq so that we might have maintained larger forces in Afghanistan that would have been able to provide protection for a much larger and well-protected development program for that country, and perhaps to capture Bin Ladin and Mullah Omar. Then, when we finally invaded Iraq, we should have immediately worked out an agreement with the former army that would have allowed a much quicker transfer of power to Iraqis. It would not have been to a well-formed democratic government, probably to something more on a par with that in Pakistan or Egypt. Following this script, by now our armed services would have been largely free of these extra burdens, able to be directed toward reducing the nefarious sway of the administrations of Sudan and North Korea. With this freedom, we could be far more aggressive and effective in meeting these new challenges than we are today.
Even before 9/11, I had concluded that there were four states in the world that the United States should move urgently to transform with the help of the world community: North Korea, Afghanistan, Iraq, and Sudan. There were many other failed states in the world, such as Haiti or Somalia, but these four states stood out in terms of egregious human rights violations, denials of freedom on a scale far beyond that found in their neighbors. I was not in this regard concerned with dangers such as WMD, but certainly North Korea and Iraq were worthy of concern on this score. Nor was I concerned with al-Qaida in Afghanistan — the oppression of its women was reason enough — the shelling of the Buddhas was the last straw.
Now, and for other reasons, we have acted against the leadership in two of the four. Neither has been, nor is likely to be, transformed quickly into a paradise. But Afghanistanis and Iraqis lead lives today that offer possibilities that they did not have before. This will be the case in Iraq even if the Americans are "thrown out" in the near future. We have, however, not yet acted effectively to alter the situation in Sudan or North Korea. Each country presents its own special problems, and to resolve these we will eventually get the assistance of the international community.
The United States has been remarkably unconcerned about North Korea. Even if it had not had a nuclear buildup, the callous and thoughtless way its regime has crushed its people and allowed hundreds of thousands to starve for ideological reasons would have been reason enough to act long before now. Now, the continual off again, on again nuclear threat, apparently engineered as part of a giant blackmail scheme, gives an additional strong reason to act with little delay. Yet two of the other main players, China and Russia, still seem unwilling to take a strong stance. More important, our ally, South Korea, the country whose entire success, indeed existence, since World War has depended on continuous American protection is carrying on as though the North were a "normal state", if only a little poorer than most. If Americans cannot imagine why Iraqis think of us as an "occupying force", they should consider South Korea where a large and vocal segment of the population also believes that we are an occupying force. They seem convinced, against all evidence, that if the Americans left, all would be peace and quiet on the Peninsula, with the North adopting the good life of the South at its own pace.
It is tempting, of course, to consider North Korea something like the Soviet Union just before Perestroika. Unfortunately, North Korea is immeasurably more repressive. Many Russians knew that they were oppressed by communism and knew that the rest of the world was leaving them behind because of their system. There is little reason to believe that such beliefs are widespread in the North — although given the right conditions there could be an explosion that would make the North another version of East Germany with the wall torn down. I raise these possibilities not because I believe them, but to suggest that Southerners who think this way should not be totally dismissed. Meanwhile, the United States has to deal with an intolerable North and a politically hard to deal with South while continuing to bear the burden of preventing major nuclear destruction in the Far East (we cannot know it is all a bluff).
What has happened in the Sudan is that the long civil war between the North and South, of Muslims in the North against Christians and Animists in the South has claimed countless lives directly and indirectly in the last thirty years. Starting in the 1980s, this conflict spilled over into Darfur in the West where there had long been unrelated struggles among tribal and ethnic groups. Even though all groups were Muslim, some considered themselves "Arab" while others were seen as "black", some were settled farmers, and some were nomads. The government at first started arming groups to resist the Southern forces that had established a base. Later, after this base disintegrated, the Westerners started a revolutionary movement of their own, particularly among the non-Arabs. (Darfur was only incorporated in Sudan in 1917.) The government sent a relief force, but was badly beaten. In response, the government then began arming the nomadic groups, particularly the "janjaweed", loosely organized brigands. These appear to have been asked to solve the regional problem by driving out or killing the members of the principal settled tribes. (All agree that with environmental degradation, there is simply not enough land for the various groups, so in a brutal way this may have made sense in Khartoum.) The result has been a humanitarian tragedy that the Sudanese government instigated and has been unwilling or unable to stop. International relief organizations have found it extremely difficult to operate in the area, as well as in neighboring Chad where many refugees have fled. The reason has been the very difficult conditions, especially transportation, and the reluctance of the Sudanese government (and perhaps to some degree the Chadian) to allow them free access. At first, the United States and other major states were unwilling to press too hard on this issue because after many years of effort they thought they had reached a working agreement among the leaders of the North and South to settle their larger war. However, the world is at last turning its attention to Darfur. We do not know yet with what result.
The tragedy in Sudan illustrates why the United States, no matter how powerful, must not waste its resources on ill-timed and poorly planned adventures. We should, for example, have waited a year before invading Iraq so that we might have maintained larger forces in Afghanistan that would have been able to provide protection for a much larger and well-protected development program for that country, and perhaps to capture Bin Ladin and Mullah Omar. Then, when we finally invaded Iraq, we should have immediately worked out an agreement with the former army that would have allowed a much quicker transfer of power to Iraqis. It would not have been to a well-formed democratic government, probably to something more on a par with that in Pakistan or Egypt. Following this script, by now our armed services would have been largely free of these extra burdens, able to be directed toward reducing the nefarious sway of the administrations of Sudan and North Korea. With this freedom, we could be far more aggressive and effective in meeting these new challenges than we are today.
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