Wednesday, June 30, 2004
Pause or a Shift in the Weather?
We have heard of little violence for the last two days. Every respite is a welcome one, but what does this mean? It could mean that the opposition was putting all its marbles on a spectacular or series of spectaculars on June 30, and became confused or maybe just delayed by the early transition. It may be the insurgents are simply taking a breather. Or it could mean that many Iraqi anti-Americans are pulling back from the battle, waiting to see what will happen. It is significant that the Islamic Press seems to have been at least as positive about the change as our elite press has been. Official Egypt played up the transfer. Official Syria called it a positive step that they hoped would lead to full sovereignty. The reaction of the Iranian Foreign Ministry was the same. Its spokesman added: "The interim government is expected to provide grounds for the restoration of full sovereignty, the real end of the occupation and free and timely general elections."
A former CIA expert (Reuel Gerecht) in today's Op-Ed argues that for now the people will give the new government the benefit of the doubt. He says most Sunnis and Shiites are tired of the fighting and they are tired of the fundamentalists that in some areas have taken control away from the local insurgents, their traditional leaders, even from former Baathists. He suggests, however, that Allawi's approach is too heavily based on reviving the army in all its glory (five divisions). He seems altogether too comfortable with the Sunni Baathist officers with which he spent most of his career. Gerecht argues that unless Shiite militias are integrated fairly soon into top positions in this new army, the Shi'a community may see it as little more than a revival of the old Sunni state, and rise once again. He advises that we press the new government to replicate elected local government such as that in Mosul to develop a sound and believable basis for an early return to democracy, a route he sees preferable to overemphasis on security.
Nir Rosen's report in the July 5 New Yorker on several visits he made into Falluja offers a valuable glimpse into the insurgency in what may be the most effectively anti-American of the Sunni centers of power. At the beginning of his tale the locals appeared very proud of the fact that they had driven the Americans out. He found Falluja full of armed groups of every description, often in competition with one another. Increasingly it appeared that the "foreigners", better armed and more cohesive were displacing the local sheikhs and imams from their positions of undisputed power. They put some areas under extreme conservative religious rule, a way of life few Iraqis want. It was no doubt they who had the Shi'a truck drivers killed. Thus, while the Falluja brigade that was supposed to bring peace eventually failed to control the area, the extreme forces that in large part defeated them seem to be in the process of alienating the general populace. (Psychologically, this is somewhat parallel to the activity in some Shi'a cities where the welcome for the Mahdi army was short-lived.)
The insurgency's fatal flaw may be that it has been unable to develop a coherent vision of how Iraq would be ruled were the Americans driven out. The Shi'a have two visions, one a replay of Iran, the other a more secular democratic state with legal space for Islam. The secular westernizers have the implicit vision of a more or less western democracy with a secular constitution, a vision that harkens back to the system developing in Iraq before the Baathists. The Baathists probably want a revived authoritarian state without the excesses of the past (although they have not spelled this out; it is this vision that Gerecht seems to fear Allawi, a former Baathist, actually has in the back of his mind). Others may have the vision of a more traditional, tribal state — this also has not been spelled out. The Kurds want either a federal state or several states. So the average Iraqi may be confused once he thinks beyond getting his nation back. Again, the interim government may be something a little more concrete than he has been offered by the insurgents.
In any event, we can hope that Zarqawi and other foreigners have overplayed their hand in many parts of Iraq, leaving the general populace willing for the time being to support the interim government as the most credible road to peace under Iraqi control that is open to them.
We have heard of little violence for the last two days. Every respite is a welcome one, but what does this mean? It could mean that the opposition was putting all its marbles on a spectacular or series of spectaculars on June 30, and became confused or maybe just delayed by the early transition. It may be the insurgents are simply taking a breather. Or it could mean that many Iraqi anti-Americans are pulling back from the battle, waiting to see what will happen. It is significant that the Islamic Press seems to have been at least as positive about the change as our elite press has been. Official Egypt played up the transfer. Official Syria called it a positive step that they hoped would lead to full sovereignty. The reaction of the Iranian Foreign Ministry was the same. Its spokesman added: "The interim government is expected to provide grounds for the restoration of full sovereignty, the real end of the occupation and free and timely general elections."
A former CIA expert (Reuel Gerecht) in today's Op-Ed argues that for now the people will give the new government the benefit of the doubt. He says most Sunnis and Shiites are tired of the fighting and they are tired of the fundamentalists that in some areas have taken control away from the local insurgents, their traditional leaders, even from former Baathists. He suggests, however, that Allawi's approach is too heavily based on reviving the army in all its glory (five divisions). He seems altogether too comfortable with the Sunni Baathist officers with which he spent most of his career. Gerecht argues that unless Shiite militias are integrated fairly soon into top positions in this new army, the Shi'a community may see it as little more than a revival of the old Sunni state, and rise once again. He advises that we press the new government to replicate elected local government such as that in Mosul to develop a sound and believable basis for an early return to democracy, a route he sees preferable to overemphasis on security.
Nir Rosen's report in the July 5 New Yorker on several visits he made into Falluja offers a valuable glimpse into the insurgency in what may be the most effectively anti-American of the Sunni centers of power. At the beginning of his tale the locals appeared very proud of the fact that they had driven the Americans out. He found Falluja full of armed groups of every description, often in competition with one another. Increasingly it appeared that the "foreigners", better armed and more cohesive were displacing the local sheikhs and imams from their positions of undisputed power. They put some areas under extreme conservative religious rule, a way of life few Iraqis want. It was no doubt they who had the Shi'a truck drivers killed. Thus, while the Falluja brigade that was supposed to bring peace eventually failed to control the area, the extreme forces that in large part defeated them seem to be in the process of alienating the general populace. (Psychologically, this is somewhat parallel to the activity in some Shi'a cities where the welcome for the Mahdi army was short-lived.)
The insurgency's fatal flaw may be that it has been unable to develop a coherent vision of how Iraq would be ruled were the Americans driven out. The Shi'a have two visions, one a replay of Iran, the other a more secular democratic state with legal space for Islam. The secular westernizers have the implicit vision of a more or less western democracy with a secular constitution, a vision that harkens back to the system developing in Iraq before the Baathists. The Baathists probably want a revived authoritarian state without the excesses of the past (although they have not spelled this out; it is this vision that Gerecht seems to fear Allawi, a former Baathist, actually has in the back of his mind). Others may have the vision of a more traditional, tribal state — this also has not been spelled out. The Kurds want either a federal state or several states. So the average Iraqi may be confused once he thinks beyond getting his nation back. Again, the interim government may be something a little more concrete than he has been offered by the insurgents.
In any event, we can hope that Zarqawi and other foreigners have overplayed their hand in many parts of Iraq, leaving the general populace willing for the time being to support the interim government as the most credible road to peace under Iraqi control that is open to them.
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