Iraq and Afghanistan

A New American Strategy?

Today's paper analyzes in some detail what is said to be a new, and successful American strategy in Iraq. Their example is the effort made by the First Armored Division to stop and then destroy the Shiite militia of Moqtada al-Sadr. It combined rapid response with political action. Its units moved long distances in single days, engaging the militia in nearly every place that the Sadrist threatened to control south of Baghdad (there is no discussion here of the Sadr City area of Baghdad). The only area that they avoided attacking the Sadrists was the most holy shrine in Najaf — and this is the only area where the Sadrists are said to still have a significant presence in the South. At the same time, as it carried out this rather complex offensive, it began negotiations with all the parties that might help the effort. In particular, it made sure that after each battle money was spent, and locals were hired, to repair the damage that the fighting had entailed.

If even half this story checks out in the end, it is an important move forward. Let us hope our units can continue acting this effectively in the South. However, it may not be a strategy that can be easily transferred to the Triangle. The Falluja model seems in the end to be less than successful (although for a time it did solve our problem). (It may have actually been the Falluja example that may have inspired what the First Armored did.) The difference may be that the Sadrist militia was well-known to all involved while the forces that are striking so successfully in the Sunni regions are more amorphous, less easy to "get a handle on". Our enemies in the Triangle have so far, outside of Falluja, been less intent on taking and holding cities than the Sadrists were, making their units harder to corner and destroy. Thus, it may not be possible to replicate the First Armored's methods elsewhere.