Wednesday, June 16, 2004
Iraq's Sunni Resistance: Baath or al-Qaida?
The daily death toll in Iraq and the success of the resistance's anti-infrastructure campaign wears down all those trying to secure the peace: the Coalition forces, the Iraqi civilians, and the interim government security forces. But who is doing what?
Recently I suggested that a pattern was developing in which the resistance was coming more and more to look like a Baath-Sunni struggle against the spectre of an emerging political system in which they will play a much diminished role. The idea that this is the emerging pattern was strengthened by the news of massive Shi'a demonstrations in Baghdad against what they said was a Sunni imam's call for the killing of six Shi'a truck drivers in Falluja. This could, of course, have been a provocation deliberately engineered by the resistance in the spirit of the much discussed letter of Zarqawi in which he proposes that the emerging system can be derailed by igniting a sectarian war of Shi'a and Sunni.
But the events of the last few days, and the increasing role of Sunni religious leaders in the resistance, also suggest that I might have been mistaken in thinking that our principal enemy was a remnant of the Baath structure. Baath was, after all, a fascist party modeled on that of the National Socialists. It was anti-religious and modernist, dedicated to moving the country forcibly into the modern world. It is true that toward the end of his rule Saddam increasingly used religious symbols and slogans to "rally the troops", but it is unlikely anyone really believed him. Yet now the actions in Iraq in which Zarqawi, a person claiming allegiance and connection to al-Qaida, and parallel actions in Saudi Arabia seem to fit better than my old assumption into an al-Qaida pattern that is fueled primarily by religious fanaticism. Zarqawi is, in fact, claiming a role in recent murders. The fact that the major efforts in the last few days have often been the product of suicide missions also fit the al-Qaida pattern better than the Baathist (although the history of the Sri Lankan Tamil movement shows that suicide missions need not have a religious component).
So where are we? First, we must remember that al-Qaida has and has had, only a handful of "card-carrying" members. Most of what the media and the government speaks of as "al-Qaida" refers to a body of extremists in many nations loosely linked together by a common overall objective (killing Americans and their allies, killing all non-Muslims that get in the way, killing all Muslims who differ with their methods in the Jihad against the foreigner). These persons labeled "al-Qaida" do not, however, necessarily take orders from Bin Ladin or his close associates. They are helped when possible by the center, and their memberships present a willing cadre of people that can be enlisted by Bin Ladin and his associates for major operations (such as the presumed to be planned attack in the near future within the United States).
Second, what started as a purely nationalist struggle (at least in the triangle) has metamorphosed into a religious-nationalist struggle. We must begin this reassessment by affirming the unsurprising conclusion of the 9/11 staff that Saddam and al-Qaida did not have a working relationship prior to 9/11. But what has happened since? We can assume that in spite of the self-serving over-estimation of the number of "foreigners" estimated by our government as having come into Iraq to fight the Coalition forces, in fact there has been a significant movement of foreigners into Iraq since our invasion, a movement instigated, aided, and abetted by al-Qaida. We may mean hundreds, perhaps more than 1000. These are well-trained, dedicated persons, some of whom have held leadership positions in other contexts. They have come to aid the Baathists because the Baathists are the group most active in killing Americans. The result has probably been an unavoidable growing together of the two movements, with the fanaticism and religious values of the newcomers serving to complement the nationalism, military background, and local know how of the old Saddam structure. At this point it might be hard to determine "who is in control". Probably no one. In many ways this makes the problem more difficult.
The daily death toll in Iraq and the success of the resistance's anti-infrastructure campaign wears down all those trying to secure the peace: the Coalition forces, the Iraqi civilians, and the interim government security forces. But who is doing what?
Recently I suggested that a pattern was developing in which the resistance was coming more and more to look like a Baath-Sunni struggle against the spectre of an emerging political system in which they will play a much diminished role. The idea that this is the emerging pattern was strengthened by the news of massive Shi'a demonstrations in Baghdad against what they said was a Sunni imam's call for the killing of six Shi'a truck drivers in Falluja. This could, of course, have been a provocation deliberately engineered by the resistance in the spirit of the much discussed letter of Zarqawi in which he proposes that the emerging system can be derailed by igniting a sectarian war of Shi'a and Sunni.
But the events of the last few days, and the increasing role of Sunni religious leaders in the resistance, also suggest that I might have been mistaken in thinking that our principal enemy was a remnant of the Baath structure. Baath was, after all, a fascist party modeled on that of the National Socialists. It was anti-religious and modernist, dedicated to moving the country forcibly into the modern world. It is true that toward the end of his rule Saddam increasingly used religious symbols and slogans to "rally the troops", but it is unlikely anyone really believed him. Yet now the actions in Iraq in which Zarqawi, a person claiming allegiance and connection to al-Qaida, and parallel actions in Saudi Arabia seem to fit better than my old assumption into an al-Qaida pattern that is fueled primarily by religious fanaticism. Zarqawi is, in fact, claiming a role in recent murders. The fact that the major efforts in the last few days have often been the product of suicide missions also fit the al-Qaida pattern better than the Baathist (although the history of the Sri Lankan Tamil movement shows that suicide missions need not have a religious component).
So where are we? First, we must remember that al-Qaida has and has had, only a handful of "card-carrying" members. Most of what the media and the government speaks of as "al-Qaida" refers to a body of extremists in many nations loosely linked together by a common overall objective (killing Americans and their allies, killing all non-Muslims that get in the way, killing all Muslims who differ with their methods in the Jihad against the foreigner). These persons labeled "al-Qaida" do not, however, necessarily take orders from Bin Ladin or his close associates. They are helped when possible by the center, and their memberships present a willing cadre of people that can be enlisted by Bin Ladin and his associates for major operations (such as the presumed to be planned attack in the near future within the United States).
Second, what started as a purely nationalist struggle (at least in the triangle) has metamorphosed into a religious-nationalist struggle. We must begin this reassessment by affirming the unsurprising conclusion of the 9/11 staff that Saddam and al-Qaida did not have a working relationship prior to 9/11. But what has happened since? We can assume that in spite of the self-serving over-estimation of the number of "foreigners" estimated by our government as having come into Iraq to fight the Coalition forces, in fact there has been a significant movement of foreigners into Iraq since our invasion, a movement instigated, aided, and abetted by al-Qaida. We may mean hundreds, perhaps more than 1000. These are well-trained, dedicated persons, some of whom have held leadership positions in other contexts. They have come to aid the Baathists because the Baathists are the group most active in killing Americans. The result has probably been an unavoidable growing together of the two movements, with the fanaticism and religious values of the newcomers serving to complement the nationalism, military background, and local know how of the old Saddam structure. At this point it might be hard to determine "who is in control". Probably no one. In many ways this makes the problem more difficult.
Comments:
Post a Comment
Links to this post:
