Wednesday, June 23, 2004
International Shiism and American Policy in Iraq
In an Op-Ed today, Youssef Ibrahim makes a knowledgeable argument that the United States must be more aware than it has been of the existence of an international Shi'a audience for what it does in Iraq. It is an argument that professor Cole, an authority on the Shi'a has often made. However, in the details of the argument he makes some misleading assertions that should be corrected.
(1) He compares the relationship of Ayatollah Sistani and Moqtada al-Sadr to that of (implicitly) Ayatollah Shariatmadari and Ayatollah Khomeini. It is true that like Khomeini, Moqtada is a fiery but lower ranked cleric. However, here the similarities end. First, Khomeini instigated and brought to a successful conclusion a national revolution against the Shah of Iran, a feat that Moqtada will not have an opportunity to equal regardless of what transpires in the next few months. Second, Khomeini had been a leader of Iranian religious dissidents for a generation. Third, although he was not as highly ranked as Shariatmadari, he was a man of equivalent age (important in religious circles) had attained the rank of an Ayatollah, and had published widely on religion and politics. In particular, his treatise on rule by an Islamic high jurist was considered by many a blueprint for the Iranian system that emerged. These remarks do not imply, however, that we should be careful not to take Moqtada lightly. He is positioned to play an important part. We should also be careful not to make al-Sadr a martyr, for Shi'ism was founded on martyrdom. (We can only hope that Zarqawi or someone similar doesn't try to martyr him and throw the onus on us.)
(2) In his discussion of the "Hawza", Ibrahim assumes a much more tightly knit Shi'ite world than I believe exists. While it is true that there developed over recent centuries a religious hierarchy of sorts among Shi'a communities that ignored national boundaries, this was always a flexible arrangement. The ayatollahs scattered throughout the Shi'a world might see another ayatollah or a small group of other ayatollahs as their religious superiors, but would nevertheless feel no compulsion to agree with their edicts, indeed, custom enjoined them to not copy the edicts of others. Similarly, on other more secular levels, only the loosest structures for consultation exist. It is true that Shi'as everywhere will be following what happens to Shi'as in Iraq, but they will not necessarily see themselves directly involved in these events.
(3) Ibrahim concludes by writing: "Any hopes for a secular Iraq should also be abandoned — the Shiites will dominate by force of numbers". There is actually no reason to accept the necessity of a non-secular Iraq because the Shiites will dominate numerically. Spain, for example, is dominated by Catholics, yet the Pope is very aware that it is a secular state. Ayatollah Sistani believes that his community should dominate Iraq, but he also believes that religious leaders should stay out of politics. He may wish to see some "religious principles" accepted by the new system, but the followers of President Bush and many members of the Catholic hierarchy in the United States would be likely to agree with him on many of these principles.
In an Op-Ed today, Youssef Ibrahim makes a knowledgeable argument that the United States must be more aware than it has been of the existence of an international Shi'a audience for what it does in Iraq. It is an argument that professor Cole, an authority on the Shi'a has often made. However, in the details of the argument he makes some misleading assertions that should be corrected.
(1) He compares the relationship of Ayatollah Sistani and Moqtada al-Sadr to that of (implicitly) Ayatollah Shariatmadari and Ayatollah Khomeini. It is true that like Khomeini, Moqtada is a fiery but lower ranked cleric. However, here the similarities end. First, Khomeini instigated and brought to a successful conclusion a national revolution against the Shah of Iran, a feat that Moqtada will not have an opportunity to equal regardless of what transpires in the next few months. Second, Khomeini had been a leader of Iranian religious dissidents for a generation. Third, although he was not as highly ranked as Shariatmadari, he was a man of equivalent age (important in religious circles) had attained the rank of an Ayatollah, and had published widely on religion and politics. In particular, his treatise on rule by an Islamic high jurist was considered by many a blueprint for the Iranian system that emerged. These remarks do not imply, however, that we should be careful not to take Moqtada lightly. He is positioned to play an important part. We should also be careful not to make al-Sadr a martyr, for Shi'ism was founded on martyrdom. (We can only hope that Zarqawi or someone similar doesn't try to martyr him and throw the onus on us.)
(2) In his discussion of the "Hawza", Ibrahim assumes a much more tightly knit Shi'ite world than I believe exists. While it is true that there developed over recent centuries a religious hierarchy of sorts among Shi'a communities that ignored national boundaries, this was always a flexible arrangement. The ayatollahs scattered throughout the Shi'a world might see another ayatollah or a small group of other ayatollahs as their religious superiors, but would nevertheless feel no compulsion to agree with their edicts, indeed, custom enjoined them to not copy the edicts of others. Similarly, on other more secular levels, only the loosest structures for consultation exist. It is true that Shi'as everywhere will be following what happens to Shi'as in Iraq, but they will not necessarily see themselves directly involved in these events.
(3) Ibrahim concludes by writing: "Any hopes for a secular Iraq should also be abandoned — the Shiites will dominate by force of numbers". There is actually no reason to accept the necessity of a non-secular Iraq because the Shiites will dominate numerically. Spain, for example, is dominated by Catholics, yet the Pope is very aware that it is a secular state. Ayatollah Sistani believes that his community should dominate Iraq, but he also believes that religious leaders should stay out of politics. He may wish to see some "religious principles" accepted by the new system, but the followers of President Bush and many members of the Catholic hierarchy in the United States would be likely to agree with him on many of these principles.
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