Iraq and Afghanistan

Friedman and Security in Iraq

In his important Op-Ed today, Thomas Friedman asserts that violence in Iraq is caused by an assortment of Baathists, Islamists, foreigners and thugs whose only objective is to cause Americans to react violently, thereby further delegitimizing our effort. The killings by these enemies are often random and seem to be supported by no list of demands or particular ideology. He concludes that we must keep our heads down, react as little as possible, and concentrate on training new Iraqi security forces. For, he says, security is the key issue, and only Iraqi forces will be able to guarantee security as we retire, as we must. He quotes General Petraeus as saying that we no longer strive to get Iraqis to love us. What we want now is to get them to love the new Iraq.

This all makes sense. However, we should more carefully consider the killers who oppose us. They are evidently a diverse group with many objectives. But we should take more cognizance of the fact that the basic objective of most of the units violently attacking Iraqis and Americans is to improve their position in what is to be a scramble for local, regional. and national power. Falluja, for example, is now under the control of Iraqis. In the opinion of the Times it has become a "safe haven for anti-American forces". But killing within Falluja continues because of rivalries among the anti-Americans. Peace agreements in Sadr City (part of Baghdad), Najaf, Kerbala, and Kufa were supposed to get the Sadrists off the streets, but forces calling themselves Sadrists continue to be armed, continue to attack police stations. The suspicion is that Sadrist forces are split into many subgroups willing and able to war with one another, other Shiite militias, Iraqi security services, and the Americans. We know there are also a variety of Shiite groups arrayed against them in the South, often armed, and these groups will continue to be armed whether or not disarmament if the agreement du jour.

At first, shortly after we took Baghdad, the unifying principle of the guerrillas or terrorists, in so far as they had one, was to defend Saddam and the Baathist ideology and structure. This has probably long since evolved into a simple nationalism, "get the Americans out", "kill those who cooperate with the foreigners". Now that the Americans are apparently on their way out, this unity is bound to also collapse. At least the Kurds are a known entity and it makes some sense for them to have a separate existence. For the rest of the country no such easy solution may be available. For the United States to train in the space of a few months, effective local forces that have loyalty only to "the new Iraq" is the right task, but it may not be doable. After a great deal of effort, we still do not have more than a few thousand soldiers in Afghanistan's national army. The Kabul government knows that for many years it will have to rely on a patchwork of local armies. But at least these local armies have many years of tribal history behind them and represent known quantities.

Note: Today we read that Iraq's new Prime Minister has assured the Kurds that the constitution will not be changed until after the elections. This must be cold comfort. The Kurds always knew the problem would be after the elections when the Shiites would have an absolute majority and be able to change the constitution any way they wanted. Unfortunately for the Kurds, if they wait too long to make their break, they may no longer have the forces and the administrative structures that make possible their effective departure today.