Friday, June 04, 2004
CIA and Responsibility for 9/11
The resignation of the CIA chief, George Tenet, has invited a great deal of commentary, mostly pointing out that he was about to have to endure several damning reports of what was done in his term.
However, an expert and former CIA analyst, Paul Pillar, brings us an Op-Ed today that casts doubt on whether Tenet should be singled out for criticism. He says that the intelligence services had by the mid-nineties identified Muslim terrorism and within that al-Qaida as the main dangers. The 1995 national intelligence estimate highlighted civil aviation as a vulnerable and attractive target. But they did this at a time when it was hard, and it remained hard, to effectively gain the attention of decision makers. He and a counterpart in the FBI briefed top Airline officials on this analysis. But they could not convince them that a major restructuring of airport security would be worth it. One of the problems, incidentally, was that the "best authorities" at the time were convinced the danger was in WMD rather than creative uses of more conventional means. He concludes with the sad thought that administrations do not make major changes in their thinking until after a tragedy, and that no amount of analytical work within an intelligence agency can be decisive. His second conclusion reiterates a statement of Tenet that "warning is not good enough without the structure to put it into action".
All of which makes a problem of relevancy for those many such as myself who spend a lifetime looking on from the bench.
The resignation of the CIA chief, George Tenet, has invited a great deal of commentary, mostly pointing out that he was about to have to endure several damning reports of what was done in his term.
However, an expert and former CIA analyst, Paul Pillar, brings us an Op-Ed today that casts doubt on whether Tenet should be singled out for criticism. He says that the intelligence services had by the mid-nineties identified Muslim terrorism and within that al-Qaida as the main dangers. The 1995 national intelligence estimate highlighted civil aviation as a vulnerable and attractive target. But they did this at a time when it was hard, and it remained hard, to effectively gain the attention of decision makers. He and a counterpart in the FBI briefed top Airline officials on this analysis. But they could not convince them that a major restructuring of airport security would be worth it. One of the problems, incidentally, was that the "best authorities" at the time were convinced the danger was in WMD rather than creative uses of more conventional means. He concludes with the sad thought that administrations do not make major changes in their thinking until after a tragedy, and that no amount of analytical work within an intelligence agency can be decisive. His second conclusion reiterates a statement of Tenet that "warning is not good enough without the structure to put it into action".
All of which makes a problem of relevancy for those many such as myself who spend a lifetime looking on from the bench.
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