Wednesday, June 30, 2004
Biological Warfare: Can Defense be Counterproductive?
In the June 29th Science section of the NYT, the campaign of Richard Ebright against new super secure laboratories is discussed. It seems that in the wake of 9/11, some of the leading institutions and experts in the biological warfare field have argued that we need new laboratories devoted to developing, and testing the defenses against, a new class of super bugs that have not yet been developed. Ebright, now a rather lonely expert in the field, says these plans should not be realized. He argues that the proposed laboratories will be expensive, are unnecessary, and are quite likely to actually make more likely the threats they are designed to protect against. He argues that for the near future terrorist biological warfare will in all probability be devised on the basis of already existing agents. He also points out that the main source of such weapons in the past have been the existing laboratories. Thus, instead of protecting us, the laboratories, by requiring hundreds of new workers and the need to develop new procedures, could make available extremely serious agents that would otherwise not exist.
Without knowing enough to comment, I nevertheless sympathize with his case. Too often, people in a field look to the wondrous future that government funds might provide for their institutions and careers. I do not want to say that scientists and scientific entrepreneurs are often willfully dishonest. But as enthusiasts seeking new frontiers, they find it easy to convince themselves that cherished new programs are in the interest of us all. I hope Ebright's arguments are taken seriously.
In the June 29th Science section of the NYT, the campaign of Richard Ebright against new super secure laboratories is discussed. It seems that in the wake of 9/11, some of the leading institutions and experts in the biological warfare field have argued that we need new laboratories devoted to developing, and testing the defenses against, a new class of super bugs that have not yet been developed. Ebright, now a rather lonely expert in the field, says these plans should not be realized. He argues that the proposed laboratories will be expensive, are unnecessary, and are quite likely to actually make more likely the threats they are designed to protect against. He argues that for the near future terrorist biological warfare will in all probability be devised on the basis of already existing agents. He also points out that the main source of such weapons in the past have been the existing laboratories. Thus, instead of protecting us, the laboratories, by requiring hundreds of new workers and the need to develop new procedures, could make available extremely serious agents that would otherwise not exist.
Without knowing enough to comment, I nevertheless sympathize with his case. Too often, people in a field look to the wondrous future that government funds might provide for their institutions and careers. I do not want to say that scientists and scientific entrepreneurs are often willfully dishonest. But as enthusiasts seeking new frontiers, they find it easy to convince themselves that cherished new programs are in the interest of us all. I hope Ebright's arguments are taken seriously.
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