Monday, June 21, 2004
Americans and Iraqis: Deciding on Responsibilities
The recent bombing of what was said to be a "safe house" for foreign terrorists within Falluja again raises the question of the boundaries of Iraqi and American action. Apparently, the American Marines and a group of Iraqis ginned up by a Colonel Latif worked out an arrangement several weeks back that the Americans would no longer try to take control of Falluja. Instead an Iraqi force made up of former Baathists and other insurgents (or whoever) would man the barricades and police the city. Not surprisingly, the Americans have not been happy with the result. Parts of Falluja have evidently become bases for militants. The Iraqi brigade "keeps the peace" most of the time, but it does not make a great effort to interfere with insurgents as long as they do not fight them in the city. Frustrated, the Americans made the air attack. Locals said all they killed were civilians. The Iraqi government says that they did kill some serious insurgents, possible of the Zarqawi group. The Times reports today that this version now seems accepted by many of the men in the street of Falluja — they don't appreciate the foreigners anyhow. As Juan Cole says of this and similar cases, it is hard for outsiders to ever know.
The new government (not yet installed, but acting as though it is) continues to talk of martial law. It sees such things as curfews, and unlimited searches, and no-go areas as instruments to be applied on a case by case basis, starting perhaps with Sadr City and Falluja. It is significant that the leaders of the interim government now see their forces as the main forces for counterinsurgency force in the heart of the country, believing that the Americans would do better controlling the country's borders. To me this makes sense, if they can do it. But it is the exact opposite of how the Americans had imagined originally they would divide up chores (placing the new Iraqi forces on the borders). The Iraqi leaders believe they can succeed better than the Americans in urban warfare because they can more easily tell the good guys from the bad guys, and they can more easily control a situation through mediation with all the parties involved than can Americans. Thus, they hope to succeed with much less firepower. This may eventually lead to the division of the country into many fiefdoms under the effective control of tribal, sectarian, or party leaders. But this may be the best that they or we can do.
Meanwhile, to the north, the Kurds are steadily expanding their frontiers and are not about to disband their militias (peshmerga). The expansion is justified as merely righting the injustice of the Saddam years when the Kurds were relocated out of these areas. But the guys with the guns may get greedy. And those newly displaced may find their own leaders to help them fight back. It is said that the new government is cooperating with Chalabi, using him as a mediator of the dispute of the new government with the Kurds. They are also actively working in bringing Moqtada al-Sadr into the new political world, and he seems to be moving in their direction. Interim government leaders are also claiming that disbanding the army was our worst mistake and that they are going to reverse that decision — a process that in a murky way seems well under way. Clearly, the interim leaders are able in the midst of assassinations and chaos to make concessions and visualize directions that the Americans have been unable to.
The Times (indirectly) and Middle East experts such as Professor Cole continue to denigrate the new civilian leaders, believing that little has change with the establishment of the new system. But it seems to me that we will have to wait and see. The new (or newly positioned) leaders are quite active and brave. As long as they can dodge assassination bullets and build a capability to tamp down the destruction, keeping rebuilding ahead of new destruction, they will come to be taken more seriously. Shifting the burden to them was essential. We needed to do it now and we did. They are our best bet. Let us hope that they get discriminating and effective support from our military and political leaders on the ground.
The recent bombing of what was said to be a "safe house" for foreign terrorists within Falluja again raises the question of the boundaries of Iraqi and American action. Apparently, the American Marines and a group of Iraqis ginned up by a Colonel Latif worked out an arrangement several weeks back that the Americans would no longer try to take control of Falluja. Instead an Iraqi force made up of former Baathists and other insurgents (or whoever) would man the barricades and police the city. Not surprisingly, the Americans have not been happy with the result. Parts of Falluja have evidently become bases for militants. The Iraqi brigade "keeps the peace" most of the time, but it does not make a great effort to interfere with insurgents as long as they do not fight them in the city. Frustrated, the Americans made the air attack. Locals said all they killed were civilians. The Iraqi government says that they did kill some serious insurgents, possible of the Zarqawi group. The Times reports today that this version now seems accepted by many of the men in the street of Falluja — they don't appreciate the foreigners anyhow. As Juan Cole says of this and similar cases, it is hard for outsiders to ever know.
The new government (not yet installed, but acting as though it is) continues to talk of martial law. It sees such things as curfews, and unlimited searches, and no-go areas as instruments to be applied on a case by case basis, starting perhaps with Sadr City and Falluja. It is significant that the leaders of the interim government now see their forces as the main forces for counterinsurgency force in the heart of the country, believing that the Americans would do better controlling the country's borders. To me this makes sense, if they can do it. But it is the exact opposite of how the Americans had imagined originally they would divide up chores (placing the new Iraqi forces on the borders). The Iraqi leaders believe they can succeed better than the Americans in urban warfare because they can more easily tell the good guys from the bad guys, and they can more easily control a situation through mediation with all the parties involved than can Americans. Thus, they hope to succeed with much less firepower. This may eventually lead to the division of the country into many fiefdoms under the effective control of tribal, sectarian, or party leaders. But this may be the best that they or we can do.
Meanwhile, to the north, the Kurds are steadily expanding their frontiers and are not about to disband their militias (peshmerga). The expansion is justified as merely righting the injustice of the Saddam years when the Kurds were relocated out of these areas. But the guys with the guns may get greedy. And those newly displaced may find their own leaders to help them fight back. It is said that the new government is cooperating with Chalabi, using him as a mediator of the dispute of the new government with the Kurds. They are also actively working in bringing Moqtada al-Sadr into the new political world, and he seems to be moving in their direction. Interim government leaders are also claiming that disbanding the army was our worst mistake and that they are going to reverse that decision — a process that in a murky way seems well under way. Clearly, the interim leaders are able in the midst of assassinations and chaos to make concessions and visualize directions that the Americans have been unable to.
The Times (indirectly) and Middle East experts such as Professor Cole continue to denigrate the new civilian leaders, believing that little has change with the establishment of the new system. But it seems to me that we will have to wait and see. The new (or newly positioned) leaders are quite active and brave. As long as they can dodge assassination bullets and build a capability to tamp down the destruction, keeping rebuilding ahead of new destruction, they will come to be taken more seriously. Shifting the burden to them was essential. We needed to do it now and we did. They are our best bet. Let us hope that they get discriminating and effective support from our military and political leaders on the ground.
Comments:
Post a Comment
Links to this post:
