Wednesday, May 19, 2004
Thoughts on Nationalism and Religion in Iraq
Many years ago I wrote a research paper on Kurdish nationalist movements in the nineteenth century. Using the term "nationalist" was risky, for it was unclear whether the Kurds actually thought of themselves as a "nationality" at the time. Perhaps they were defined as "Kurds" by outsiders simply because they spoke one or another Kurdish dialect. The Kurdish national movement that exists now was largely a result of the spread of the idea of "nationality" to the region in the twentieth century. In any event, what I found was that the Kurdish movements of the nineteenth century against the Ottomans were actually movements led by one or another local leader for ostensibly "religious" reasons. This experience has come to mind when the media discuss nationalism and religion in Iraq today. To many, but hardly all, of the people labeled with one or another religious or ethnic label in Iraq the labels are symbols of group affiliation with a transient meaning akin to the affiliations of Westerners to athletic teams. When writing of Iraq, the media often write of the struggle of Shi'a and Sunni. These are, however, actually broad groupings of people, each divided into many subgroups, based on theological differences, identifications with particular religious leaders, or cross-cutting affiliations The Kurds, for example, are most Sunni. Yet commentators do not include them as "Sunni" when speaking of potential bases for conflict in the country. They assume that nationality trumps religion for most Kurds when political issues are involved. Yet the Kurds have historically been divided among themselves more than they have been together, divisions that for the moment they seem to have set aside.
It "seems" as though what we are fighting in Iraq now is largely a nationalist movement deriving its primary strength from an intense desire to throw the Americans out. The fact that the movement uses suicide bombers suggests to some religious motivation, since to their minds only belief in a divine mission would justify such sacrifice. Yet recent studies have pointed out that suicide attacks are as likely to have nationalist as religious motivation, with the Tamil movement in Sri Lanka a case in point. The willingness of the Shi'a and Sunni groups to help one another in Falluja and now in the holy cities fits a nationalist pattern, as does the willingness of the Sadrist forces to endanger the country's holiest shrines in spite of repeated calls by Shi'a religious leaders to demilitarize the shrine areas. We also recall that the Baathist movement was an extreme nationalist movement modelled on Germany's National Socialist Party. The Baathists suppressed religious groups in general and were hated by conservative Muslims of all stripes, including for many years bin Ladin. There are today some foreigners fighting in Iraq, presumably for religious reasons. But here again, are they not more the product of an "Islamic Nationalism" or "Arab Nationalism" than of religious zealotry?
Finally, there is the question of how powerful and lasting we imagine "Iraqi nationalism" itself to be. After all, Iraq's existence in modern times dates no further back than the end of World War I, and it was formed and maintained under British tutelage until the 1950s. We can be sure, I believe, that because of the extreme nationalist propaganda of the Baathist period, and the bloody struggle with Iran followed by the first and second wars with the United States and the sanctions of the 1990s that many Iraqis have rapidly developed a strong sense of national identification, one that for the time being the Kurdish leaders are willing to buy into. Yet we should be cautious. The world has had a great deal of experience lately with "failed" African countries formed during the colonialist period. It is hard to imagine that Iraq will end up falling into this pattern; it is perhaps too middle class for that. But the possibility remains.
Many years ago I wrote a research paper on Kurdish nationalist movements in the nineteenth century. Using the term "nationalist" was risky, for it was unclear whether the Kurds actually thought of themselves as a "nationality" at the time. Perhaps they were defined as "Kurds" by outsiders simply because they spoke one or another Kurdish dialect. The Kurdish national movement that exists now was largely a result of the spread of the idea of "nationality" to the region in the twentieth century. In any event, what I found was that the Kurdish movements of the nineteenth century against the Ottomans were actually movements led by one or another local leader for ostensibly "religious" reasons. This experience has come to mind when the media discuss nationalism and religion in Iraq today. To many, but hardly all, of the people labeled with one or another religious or ethnic label in Iraq the labels are symbols of group affiliation with a transient meaning akin to the affiliations of Westerners to athletic teams. When writing of Iraq, the media often write of the struggle of Shi'a and Sunni. These are, however, actually broad groupings of people, each divided into many subgroups, based on theological differences, identifications with particular religious leaders, or cross-cutting affiliations The Kurds, for example, are most Sunni. Yet commentators do not include them as "Sunni" when speaking of potential bases for conflict in the country. They assume that nationality trumps religion for most Kurds when political issues are involved. Yet the Kurds have historically been divided among themselves more than they have been together, divisions that for the moment they seem to have set aside.
It "seems" as though what we are fighting in Iraq now is largely a nationalist movement deriving its primary strength from an intense desire to throw the Americans out. The fact that the movement uses suicide bombers suggests to some religious motivation, since to their minds only belief in a divine mission would justify such sacrifice. Yet recent studies have pointed out that suicide attacks are as likely to have nationalist as religious motivation, with the Tamil movement in Sri Lanka a case in point. The willingness of the Shi'a and Sunni groups to help one another in Falluja and now in the holy cities fits a nationalist pattern, as does the willingness of the Sadrist forces to endanger the country's holiest shrines in spite of repeated calls by Shi'a religious leaders to demilitarize the shrine areas. We also recall that the Baathist movement was an extreme nationalist movement modelled on Germany's National Socialist Party. The Baathists suppressed religious groups in general and were hated by conservative Muslims of all stripes, including for many years bin Ladin. There are today some foreigners fighting in Iraq, presumably for religious reasons. But here again, are they not more the product of an "Islamic Nationalism" or "Arab Nationalism" than of religious zealotry?
Finally, there is the question of how powerful and lasting we imagine "Iraqi nationalism" itself to be. After all, Iraq's existence in modern times dates no further back than the end of World War I, and it was formed and maintained under British tutelage until the 1950s. We can be sure, I believe, that because of the extreme nationalist propaganda of the Baathist period, and the bloody struggle with Iran followed by the first and second wars with the United States and the sanctions of the 1990s that many Iraqis have rapidly developed a strong sense of national identification, one that for the time being the Kurdish leaders are willing to buy into. Yet we should be cautious. The world has had a great deal of experience lately with "failed" African countries formed during the colonialist period. It is hard to imagine that Iraq will end up falling into this pattern; it is perhaps too middle class for that. But the possibility remains.
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