Monday, May 10, 2004
Pause, Complexity, or a Possible Modus Vivendi?
Recent days have seemed, in spite of the "pictures", to have witnessed a slackening of the anti-U.S. war effort in Iraq. For the moment, Falluja remains out of the nightly news. Apparently the new Iraqi force in the city is calming things down, although just why and for whom is unclear. It is suspected that the Iraqi guerrillas will reemerge if the Americans really try to come back. The question is, "Why not just let the present situation ride?" Perhaps this is the answer many places.
In his most recent blog pages, Professor Cole (see earlier reference) makes some interesting points. First, he suggests that one American mistake has been to assume that the Baathist regime was a military regime, that our enemy, therefore, has been and is the military. Actually, he points out, Saddam was never in the military. His movement was civilian. (This is similar to the relation of Hitler and the top Nazis to the regular German army.) Second, he points to the fact that the Shi'a have many different militias or potential militias, none of which are sympathetic to Muqtada al-Sadr. They may well be pleased to have the Americans going after Muqtada. It offers them more of an opening for the future. However, if Muqtada is killed by the Americans, many Shiites might turn against those groups that profited by American advances and join the Sadrist uprising. Muqtada has also been attempting to form a front with the Sunnis. Meanwhile, back in Baghdad, Cole's information is that the Sadrists are essentially in control of their part of Baghdad, man the road blocks, provide services etc.
The morning paper today speaks of a major American effort to work with tribal chieftains and Shiite leaders in the south to reform and strengthen Iraqi security forces, somewhat on the model adopted for Falluja. The exact status of the effort is, like everything else, still unclear. But promising.
Perhaps a temporary but manageable modus vivendi is emerging. This will consist of (1) areas under control of pro-Coalition or at least temporarily cooperative groups (most Kurdish areas are an obvious example), (2) areas under the control of less cooperative Iraqis content to manage and secure their own areas (Falluja perhaps, as well as eventually holy cities such as Najaf and Karbala), and (3) areas under the control of those who wish to maintain and enflame a larger fight. If areas defined as (3) do not interfere too much with transportation and development needs (civilian and military), then we may be able to stabilize the situation long enough to go through the stages of political transformation that have been suggested by the United States, the United Nations, and increasingly by interested Iraqi groups. As stated in a previous entry, elections could initially be held in the country in relatively secure areas (say areas defined as 1 or 2), with later elections held in areas defined as (3) if and when these areas are made a part of a functioning Iraqi political system under Iraqi control.
The pace at which security responsibilities are transferred and the promised date on which the bulk of coalition forces will leave Iraq have to be carefully monitored and adjusted in tandem with the degree to which the suggested modus vivendi actually emerges and with changing estimates as to how long it can be held without the situation deteriorating once again.
Recent days have seemed, in spite of the "pictures", to have witnessed a slackening of the anti-U.S. war effort in Iraq. For the moment, Falluja remains out of the nightly news. Apparently the new Iraqi force in the city is calming things down, although just why and for whom is unclear. It is suspected that the Iraqi guerrillas will reemerge if the Americans really try to come back. The question is, "Why not just let the present situation ride?" Perhaps this is the answer many places.
In his most recent blog pages, Professor Cole (see earlier reference) makes some interesting points. First, he suggests that one American mistake has been to assume that the Baathist regime was a military regime, that our enemy, therefore, has been and is the military. Actually, he points out, Saddam was never in the military. His movement was civilian. (This is similar to the relation of Hitler and the top Nazis to the regular German army.) Second, he points to the fact that the Shi'a have many different militias or potential militias, none of which are sympathetic to Muqtada al-Sadr. They may well be pleased to have the Americans going after Muqtada. It offers them more of an opening for the future. However, if Muqtada is killed by the Americans, many Shiites might turn against those groups that profited by American advances and join the Sadrist uprising. Muqtada has also been attempting to form a front with the Sunnis. Meanwhile, back in Baghdad, Cole's information is that the Sadrists are essentially in control of their part of Baghdad, man the road blocks, provide services etc.
The morning paper today speaks of a major American effort to work with tribal chieftains and Shiite leaders in the south to reform and strengthen Iraqi security forces, somewhat on the model adopted for Falluja. The exact status of the effort is, like everything else, still unclear. But promising.
Perhaps a temporary but manageable modus vivendi is emerging. This will consist of (1) areas under control of pro-Coalition or at least temporarily cooperative groups (most Kurdish areas are an obvious example), (2) areas under the control of less cooperative Iraqis content to manage and secure their own areas (Falluja perhaps, as well as eventually holy cities such as Najaf and Karbala), and (3) areas under the control of those who wish to maintain and enflame a larger fight. If areas defined as (3) do not interfere too much with transportation and development needs (civilian and military), then we may be able to stabilize the situation long enough to go through the stages of political transformation that have been suggested by the United States, the United Nations, and increasingly by interested Iraqi groups. As stated in a previous entry, elections could initially be held in the country in relatively secure areas (say areas defined as 1 or 2), with later elections held in areas defined as (3) if and when these areas are made a part of a functioning Iraqi political system under Iraqi control.
The pace at which security responsibilities are transferred and the promised date on which the bulk of coalition forces will leave Iraq have to be carefully monitored and adjusted in tandem with the degree to which the suggested modus vivendi actually emerges and with changing estimates as to how long it can be held without the situation deteriorating once again.
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