Wednesday, May 19, 2004
Iran, Iraq and the United States
The NYT Op-Ed editor, Nicholas Kristof, follows up on his pleasant experiences in Iran with a warning that no matter how pro-American its people are today, they will still resent any heavy-handed attempt by the United States to force Iran to abandon its nuclear weapons program. He believes that such an attempt would cement the power of the ayatollahs and fail to achieve its objectives. It is too bad that nationalism should lead Iran to this point, but it makes sense for Middle Easterners when they consider that Israel has nuclear weapons and we say nothing about them — not to mention the weapons we are tacitly accept for Pakistan and India. Kristof would like to see us enter into a "grand bargain" that would include reestablishing diplomatic relations, business investment, tourism, and educational exchanges. (This is remarkably similar to the more urgent bargain proposed with North Korea, so far with no results. Still, the Iranian regime should not be compared to North Korea's.) He believes that an evolving "Islamic democracy", headquartered in Tehran, could become the center of Middle Eastern democratic transformation if Baghdad does not pan out.
All of which reminds us that what we do in Iraq has potential repercussions in Iran and vice-versa. I say potential, for what is remarkable is that so far our fumbling in Iraq has cost us little in Iranian public opinion. If this is not simply a matter of reporting, this grace period may not last. It should be remembered that for Iranians, the vast majority of whom are Shi'as, the shrines of Ali and Hussein in Najaf and Karbala are the centers of the spiritual world, more important than shrines in Iran itself. The grand ayatollahs in Iraq have also been seen at least until recently as superior in status to any of those living in Iran.
As we proceed with our efforts in Iraq, it is also important to note that the Kurds have had a national movement in Iran as well as Turkey, Iraq, Syria and elsewhere. While Kurds on the Iranian side of the border might welcome a semi-independent Kurdistan within Iraq, this will not be welcomed in Tehran nor Ankara. The Kurds have an appealing case for international recognition. They were turned down by the world community after World War I. They were sold out several times by American governments who found after supporting them for a while that they had larger considerations to consider. They were our best friends during our recent invasion of Iraq and their enclave remains the safest area for Americans. Yet we show little sign of commitment to their interests as a new Iraq evolves. Again, we are likely to have larger issues to attend to. But we should keep Kurdish interests at least at the back of our minds, attempting to work out as best we can a better deal for them in a new Iraq. Our friends are few enough in the area; it will be costly to alienate the Kurds once again.
The NYT Op-Ed editor, Nicholas Kristof, follows up on his pleasant experiences in Iran with a warning that no matter how pro-American its people are today, they will still resent any heavy-handed attempt by the United States to force Iran to abandon its nuclear weapons program. He believes that such an attempt would cement the power of the ayatollahs and fail to achieve its objectives. It is too bad that nationalism should lead Iran to this point, but it makes sense for Middle Easterners when they consider that Israel has nuclear weapons and we say nothing about them — not to mention the weapons we are tacitly accept for Pakistan and India. Kristof would like to see us enter into a "grand bargain" that would include reestablishing diplomatic relations, business investment, tourism, and educational exchanges. (This is remarkably similar to the more urgent bargain proposed with North Korea, so far with no results. Still, the Iranian regime should not be compared to North Korea's.) He believes that an evolving "Islamic democracy", headquartered in Tehran, could become the center of Middle Eastern democratic transformation if Baghdad does not pan out.
All of which reminds us that what we do in Iraq has potential repercussions in Iran and vice-versa. I say potential, for what is remarkable is that so far our fumbling in Iraq has cost us little in Iranian public opinion. If this is not simply a matter of reporting, this grace period may not last. It should be remembered that for Iranians, the vast majority of whom are Shi'as, the shrines of Ali and Hussein in Najaf and Karbala are the centers of the spiritual world, more important than shrines in Iran itself. The grand ayatollahs in Iraq have also been seen at least until recently as superior in status to any of those living in Iran.
As we proceed with our efforts in Iraq, it is also important to note that the Kurds have had a national movement in Iran as well as Turkey, Iraq, Syria and elsewhere. While Kurds on the Iranian side of the border might welcome a semi-independent Kurdistan within Iraq, this will not be welcomed in Tehran nor Ankara. The Kurds have an appealing case for international recognition. They were turned down by the world community after World War I. They were sold out several times by American governments who found after supporting them for a while that they had larger considerations to consider. They were our best friends during our recent invasion of Iraq and their enclave remains the safest area for Americans. Yet we show little sign of commitment to their interests as a new Iraq evolves. Again, we are likely to have larger issues to attend to. But we should keep Kurdish interests at least at the back of our minds, attempting to work out as best we can a better deal for them in a new Iraq. Our friends are few enough in the area; it will be costly to alienate the Kurds once again.
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