Tuesday, May 04, 2004
Inside Terrorism
Just finished Bruce Hoffman's Inside Terrorism. Since this review of the subject was completed a year or more before 9/11, it reminds us that in some circles terrorism was taken very seriously before the New York skyline was altered. Terrorists have been very active for a long time, and their efforts had been escalating since World War II.
He makes some critical points about the approach of the terrorists and how this approach has been changing. Most important is the fact that terrorists have been primarily interested in the "press" that they get for their actions. They are playing to an audience, generally in one nation or area, but increasingly worldwide. They seldom kill just to be killing. They kill to make an impression. He argues that the more secular and nationalist the terrorists the more careful and directed their efforts are. Only religious (or "spiritual") terrorists single out large sections of humanity for destruction as enemies, for their objectives are not "practical" in the normal sense. Qaddafi's action against the Pan Am flight would seem to not fit this too accurately. As a state actor rather than a private group, Qaddafi was apparently more interested in deterring and avenging attacks rather than the publicity value of his actions. Hoffman also must resolve the difficulty of deciding whether something is actually religious or not. Many so-called religious disputes are more ethnic and nationalist than religious. A person's religion is used by most people as primarily a label. People seldom die for theology. An exception might be al-Qaeda and related groups. For them religion matters, at least in so far as life styles are religious. Al-Qaeda's use of means strictly prohibited in Islam, such as suicide and attacks on women and children, would seem to indicate that it is more interested in results than theological niceties (remembering that in Islam traditional legal rules on such matters are more central than what we might call theology in Christianity).
Perhaps Hoffman's best-known contribution is his emphasis on the use of new technologies and the probable extension of this use by terrorists in the 21st century. I had forgotten how really dangerous the Aum Shinrikyo became in the eighties and nineties. At one time they had amassed as much as a billion dollars, had several research laboratories and thousands of members worldwide, including many Russians (and nuclear scientists). They carried out experimental incidents with bacteriological weapons. Nuclear weapons were being developed on a large acreage in Australia. They accumulated enough sarin gas to kill millions. They appear to botched both biological and nerve gas attacks, although the main subway sarin attack killed hundreds and could easily have killed many more. Hoffman believes that other groups will go much further than this in the future. Clearly al-Qaeda has tried but appears still far from success.
The story of Aum Shinrikyo and their enigmatic leader also tends to support the idea that we are not in the midst of a religious war. Rather, outside of particular disputes (Basques, Tamils etc.), we seem to be facing a diffuse tendency of people aggrieved by what they feel is a loss of status (Japanese, Muslims) to strike out against those with more status (which means Western Civilization and particularly the United States). Aum was built on an odd mixture of modern ideas with Hinduism and Buddhism. It was virulently anti-American, accusing the United States of being intent on destroying Japan. It was also anti-humanitarian, envisaging loss of life in the hundreds of millions in the struggle against the sect's enemies.
Just finished Bruce Hoffman's Inside Terrorism. Since this review of the subject was completed a year or more before 9/11, it reminds us that in some circles terrorism was taken very seriously before the New York skyline was altered. Terrorists have been very active for a long time, and their efforts had been escalating since World War II.
He makes some critical points about the approach of the terrorists and how this approach has been changing. Most important is the fact that terrorists have been primarily interested in the "press" that they get for their actions. They are playing to an audience, generally in one nation or area, but increasingly worldwide. They seldom kill just to be killing. They kill to make an impression. He argues that the more secular and nationalist the terrorists the more careful and directed their efforts are. Only religious (or "spiritual") terrorists single out large sections of humanity for destruction as enemies, for their objectives are not "practical" in the normal sense. Qaddafi's action against the Pan Am flight would seem to not fit this too accurately. As a state actor rather than a private group, Qaddafi was apparently more interested in deterring and avenging attacks rather than the publicity value of his actions. Hoffman also must resolve the difficulty of deciding whether something is actually religious or not. Many so-called religious disputes are more ethnic and nationalist than religious. A person's religion is used by most people as primarily a label. People seldom die for theology. An exception might be al-Qaeda and related groups. For them religion matters, at least in so far as life styles are religious. Al-Qaeda's use of means strictly prohibited in Islam, such as suicide and attacks on women and children, would seem to indicate that it is more interested in results than theological niceties (remembering that in Islam traditional legal rules on such matters are more central than what we might call theology in Christianity).
Perhaps Hoffman's best-known contribution is his emphasis on the use of new technologies and the probable extension of this use by terrorists in the 21st century. I had forgotten how really dangerous the Aum Shinrikyo became in the eighties and nineties. At one time they had amassed as much as a billion dollars, had several research laboratories and thousands of members worldwide, including many Russians (and nuclear scientists). They carried out experimental incidents with bacteriological weapons. Nuclear weapons were being developed on a large acreage in Australia. They accumulated enough sarin gas to kill millions. They appear to botched both biological and nerve gas attacks, although the main subway sarin attack killed hundreds and could easily have killed many more. Hoffman believes that other groups will go much further than this in the future. Clearly al-Qaeda has tried but appears still far from success.
The story of Aum Shinrikyo and their enigmatic leader also tends to support the idea that we are not in the midst of a religious war. Rather, outside of particular disputes (Basques, Tamils etc.), we seem to be facing a diffuse tendency of people aggrieved by what they feel is a loss of status (Japanese, Muslims) to strike out against those with more status (which means Western Civilization and particularly the United States). Aum was built on an odd mixture of modern ideas with Hinduism and Buddhism. It was virulently anti-American, accusing the United States of being intent on destroying Japan. It was also anti-humanitarian, envisaging loss of life in the hundreds of millions in the struggle against the sect's enemies.
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