Sunday, May 09, 2004
Choices for Exit
A couple of days ago, David Brooks suggested that the greatest danger of American incompetence in Iraq will be a parting resolution by this and successive American Administrations of "never again" (at least for a while). The resulting world-wide security gap will be one that will be hard to fill. For the world is going to have other crises, other issues that have to be forcibly solved — and the United States will not be there to carry the torch. North Korea and the Sudan come to mind for the agenda next month, but there will surely be many to follow. Brooks thinks the United Nations is not up to the task. This is surely the case if we mean the United Nations as a primary actor. But the United Nations as the shell within which others can act is probably the best hope we have, and we must start work as soon as possible on strengthening the usability of this framework. Much of the way in which we and the world are able to act together to meet the future will depend on how we exit Iraq.
In his front page editorial (actually it's on this Sunday's Week in Review front page and without being called an editorial it indubitably is), Roger Cohen suggests three exit strategies: (1) Announce an exit date in 2005, focusing Iraqi minds on taking over sexurity themselves, (2) make the United Nations the key player at an even earlier date, or (3) after making obeisance to the U.N., start a bitter campaign to crush the resistance. He finds all three solutions elusive. It appears to me that we will not make a decision, trying all three in turn.
The latest news is that Sadr has started a new campaign against the British in the South. We will have to see how this works out. But right now I get the impression things are better than I would have thought they would be by now. The escalating erosion of our position on the ground has not seemed to be occurring; we seem to be succeeding in Najaf and Kerbala without ruining our record with the Ayatollahs. There is a serious discussion developing on the exact form the Brahimi-UN government will have. (Regardless of the controversy, the seriousness with which it is being taken is encouraging.) If we can work out alternative (2) along with a little of (1) and (3), then we may be able to leave in 2005 with a sense of success that will make the Brooks' longer-term prediction a little less likely.
A couple of days ago, David Brooks suggested that the greatest danger of American incompetence in Iraq will be a parting resolution by this and successive American Administrations of "never again" (at least for a while). The resulting world-wide security gap will be one that will be hard to fill. For the world is going to have other crises, other issues that have to be forcibly solved — and the United States will not be there to carry the torch. North Korea and the Sudan come to mind for the agenda next month, but there will surely be many to follow. Brooks thinks the United Nations is not up to the task. This is surely the case if we mean the United Nations as a primary actor. But the United Nations as the shell within which others can act is probably the best hope we have, and we must start work as soon as possible on strengthening the usability of this framework. Much of the way in which we and the world are able to act together to meet the future will depend on how we exit Iraq.
In his front page editorial (actually it's on this Sunday's Week in Review front page and without being called an editorial it indubitably is), Roger Cohen suggests three exit strategies: (1) Announce an exit date in 2005, focusing Iraqi minds on taking over sexurity themselves, (2) make the United Nations the key player at an even earlier date, or (3) after making obeisance to the U.N., start a bitter campaign to crush the resistance. He finds all three solutions elusive. It appears to me that we will not make a decision, trying all three in turn.
The latest news is that Sadr has started a new campaign against the British in the South. We will have to see how this works out. But right now I get the impression things are better than I would have thought they would be by now. The escalating erosion of our position on the ground has not seemed to be occurring; we seem to be succeeding in Najaf and Kerbala without ruining our record with the Ayatollahs. There is a serious discussion developing on the exact form the Brahimi-UN government will have. (Regardless of the controversy, the seriousness with which it is being taken is encouraging.) If we can work out alternative (2) along with a little of (1) and (3), then we may be able to leave in 2005 with a sense of success that will make the Brooks' longer-term prediction a little less likely.
Comments:
Post a Comment
Links to this post:
